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NOTES
WOMEN IN THE CROSSFIRE: SHOULD THE
COURT ALLOW IT?
INTRODUCTION
During the Gulf War, 540,000 soldiers participated in Opera-
tion Desert Storm.1 Of these soldiers, 35,000 were women.2 Wo-
men performed combat support missions during the war 3 and
received the respect of the public4 and of Congress.5 In August
1991, Congress passed legislation to modify the current combat ex-
clusion laws and policies, and to examine further the issue of women
in combat. 6
Despite recent gains that women have accomplished in the mili-
tary, the combat exclusion issue remains controversial. While top
military leaders and proponents of combat exclusion see the issue as
a matter of national security,7 supporters of women in combat see
the issue as one of equal opportunity.8 Many opponents of the com-
bat exclusion rules consider congressional response to the issue
weak and inadequate.9 The alternative for those disheartened by
1 The American government responded to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August
1990 by deploying troops and implementing a military strategy called "Operation De-
sert Storm."
2 See Jon Nordheimer, Women's Role in Combat: The War Resumes, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 1991, at Al, A28 (discussing female soldiers' participation in the Gulf War).
3 Women flew support aircraft carrying supplies and troops into combat zones,
worked in supply units, crewed Patriot and Hawk missile units, and performed various
other duties. Id. at A28.
4 See generally David H. Hackworth, War and the Second Sex, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 1991,
at 25 (reporting that in a July 1991 Newsweek poll, 72% of the public believed that
women in combat support positions could be an advantage to the military during Opera-
tion Desert Storm).
5 During recent congressional hearings, Senator John McCain noted the achieve-
ments of females during the Gulf War. "The obvious impetus for the reexamination of
restrictions excluding women from combat roles is the outstanding performance of U.S.
servicewomen in Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield." Women in Combat: Hear-
ing of the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 101st
Cong., 2nd Sess. 56 (1990) [hereinafter Women in Combat Hearings].
6 S. Res. 3549, 8549, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 137 CONG. REC. 12417 § 530 (1991).
7 See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Barton Gellman, Combat Role for Women Stalled by Senate Panel, WASH.
PosT, July 10, 1991, at A4 [hereinafter Gellman, Senate Panel]; Rowan Scarborough, Bias
Feared in Panel on Women in Combat, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, at A3; Rowan Scarbor-
ough, Navy Pregnancies Raise Readiness Issue, WASH. TiMES, Oct. 25, 1991, at AI [hereinaf-
ter Scarborough, Navy Pregnancies].
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Congress' ineffectual response is to present the issue to the
Supreme Court.
Using the combat exclusion issue as an example, this Note eval-
uates two important jurisprudence issues: whether the Supreme
Court's "absolute deference" to Congress in military constitutional
claims adversely affects judicial review; and whether, on certain is-
sues, the political question doctrine offers a better alternative to the
principle of deference. Part I of this Note discusses the combat ex-
clusion issue, its justifications, and its critiques. 10 Part II examines
major military-related gender discrimination cases decided by the
Supreme Court and distinguishes the issues in those cases from the
combat exclusion issue. I" Part III analyzes both the principle of def-
erence, which the Court grants to Congress on military matters, and
the political question doctrine. This section argues that the latter
applies to the combat exclusion issue and concludes that, if faced
with this issue, the Court should decline review under the political
question doctrine.' 2
I
EXAMINING COMBAT EXCLUSION LAWS AND POLICIES
A. Background of Combat Exclusion Laws and Policies
Although women have served in the military since the Revolu-
tionary War, their numbers were quite low until World War I. 13
During World War II, Congress established the Women's Army
Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), Women Accepted for Voluntary Emer-
gency Service (WAVES), and "Semper Paratus, Always Ready"
(SPARs) to compensate temporarily for the manpower shortage in
the military.' 4 Three hundred fifty thousand female volunteers
served in the fields of "health care, administration, and
communications."15
After the war, Congress responded to lower male enlistments
and the impending dissolution of the WAC 16 by enacting the Wo-
10 See discussion infra part I.
II See discussion infra part II.
12 See discussion infra part III.
13 See MARTIN BINKIN & SHIRLEYJ. BACH, WOMEN AND THE MILITARY 4-7 (1977).
14 See id. at 7; see also George H. Quester, The Problem, in FEMALE SOLDIERS-COM-
BATANTS OR NONCOMBATANTS? 217, 219 (Nancy L. Goldman ed., 1982) [hereinafter FE-
MALE SOLDIERS] ("Moves were thus made to establish women's auxiliary services for
each of the military services .... [The initial move entailed less than full membership in
the military for females .... ).
15 See BINKIN & BACH, supra note 13, at 7.
16 See id. at 10; Quester, supra note 14, at 219.
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men's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948.17 The Act accom-
plished four things. First, it gave women permanent status in the
military.' 8 Second, it established that women could constitute two
percent of all enlisted personnel, and it limited the number of fe-
male officers to ten percent of the total female enlisted strength. 19
Third, it stipulated that commanders could not promote female of-
ficers above the grade of 05 (Lieutenant Colonel or its equivalent). 20
Fourth, it limited women's role in the military by excluding women
from combat duties, combat units, and combat ships.2 1 The Act al-
lowed each branch of service considerable leeway in determining
which assignments it would categorize as "combat" or "combat-
support." 22
At the Army's request, Congress did not subject it to the com-
bat exclusion laws. 23 Instead, the Act stated that "[t]he Secretary of
the Army shall prescribe the military authority which commissioned
officers of the Women's Army Corps may exercise, and the kind of
military duty to which they may be assigned." 24 The Army opposed
restrictions on the assignment of female soldiers until it was certain
how it was going to utilize them.25 In 1979, the Army dissolved the
WACs and implemented its own combat exclusion policy, which re-
stricts women to combat-support assignments.
The Armed Forces have had considerable difficulty in defining
combat.26 The definition of "combat" is important because the
17 Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-625, 62 Stat.
356.
18 Id. §§ 101, 201, 301, 62 Stat. at 356, 363, 371.
19 Id. §§ 102, 202, 302, 62 Stat. at 357, 363, 371 (repealed 1967).
20 Id. §§ 104(d)(3), 203, 303(d)(4), 62 Stat. at 357, 363-64, 371.
21 Id. §§ 101, 201, 301, 62 Stat. at 356, 363, 371.
22 See, e.g., id. § 307(a), 62 Stat. at 373
The Secretary of the Air Force shall prescribe the military authority which
female persons of the Air Force may exercise, and the kind of military
duty to which they may be assigned: Provided, That they shall not be as-
signed to duty in aircraft while such aircraft are engaged in combat
missions.
Id.
23 See BINKIN & BACH, supra note 13, at 26. At the Senate Hearings on the combat
exclusion laws, the Army argued that
[w]hile it is War Department policy to limit the utilitization of women in
the Army to noncombat jobs, it is impossible for the War Department to
outline combat areas in the future since the experts advise that modem
warfare makes the entire United States vulnerable as a combat area in the
future.
Id. (quoting Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1947, Hearings Before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1947)).
24 Women's Armed Services Intergration Act, § 509A(g), 62 Stat. at 359.
25 See BINKIN & BACH, supra note 13, at 26-27.
26 See Jill L. Goodman, Women, War, and Equality: An Examination of Sex Discrimination
in the Military, 5 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 243, 258 (1980) (stating that even after the Secre-
tary of Defense provided a definition for combat, "the term was useless in discussions
254 [Vol. 78:252
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scope of the definition correlates to the opportunities available to
women in the military. The definitions that the Armed Forces offers
do not address what combat is, but rather describes where it takes
place.27 In 1978, Congress requested that the Department of De-
fense (DOD) formulate a definition of "combat" in order to reevalu-
ate the role of women in the military. 28 DOD's definition of "close
combat" included the probability of three components: engaging
the enemy, coming into direct contact with the enemy, and risking
capture by the enemy.29
The Armed Forces effectively constrict the use of women in the
military. 30 This is accomplished in several ways. For example, the
Armed Forces exclude women from assignments that they classify as
"combat-related.131 They also exclude women from noncombat as-
signments that they designate as "high risk." In 1988 the DOD
adopted the Risk Rule in an effort to facilitate the Armed Services'
occupational classifications, which are used to exclude women from
noncombat positions. This rule is based on the level of risk in-
volved in certain assignments.3 2 The Risk Rule was considered a
type of "balancing test based on the type, degree, and duration of
certain risks." 33 The rule stated that the "[r]isks of direct combat,
exposure to hostile fire, or capture are proper criteria for closing
non-combat positions or units to women, when the type, degree, and
duration of such risks are equal to or greater than the combat
units." 34
In addition to the use of classifications, the Armed Forces ex-
clude women by reserving for men a certain number of noncombat
assignments based on the following rationales: to provide a "mobil-
about opportunities for women in the service"); Lori S. Kornblum, Women Warriors in a
Men's World: The Combat Exclusion, 2 LAW & INEQ. J. 351, 358 (1984) (pointing out that
none of the military branches have tried to "define [combat] uniformly... and to cate-
gorize jobs accordingly").
27 See Goodman, supra note 26, at 258; Kornblum, supra note 26, at 359.
28 See Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-79,
§ 303, 91 Stat. 327 (1978).
29 See Kornblum, supra note 26, at 359.
30 See Wayne E. Dillingham, The Possibility of American Military Women Becoming Prison-
ers of War: Justification for Combat Exclusion Rules?, 37 FED. BAR NEWS &J. 223, 225 (1990)
("By far, the more restrictive of these limitations have been and continue to be those
imposed as a matter of policy rather than law.").
31 10 U.S.C. §§ 8549, 6015.
32 Each branch of the Armed Forces classifies its occupations and designates jobs as
combat or combat support. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MILITARY WOMEN IN THE DE-
PARTMENT OF DEFENSE vi (1988) [hereinafter MILITARY WOMEN].
33 Dillingham, supra note 30, at 225.
34 Id. at 225 (quoting MEMORANDUM FROM THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL TO THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (Feb. 25,
1988)) (emphasis added).
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ization base for wartime,"3 5 to account for "housing limitations, ' 3 6
to maintain a proper rotation for sea-to-shore duty,3 7 and "to en-
sure that the men are provided equitable promotion and assignment
opportunities. ' 38 This policy, in combination with other restric-
tions such as more stringent recruitment standards for women, al-
lows the Armed Forces to exclude women from many of the
noncombat jobs that they are otherwise eligible to perform.3 9
B. Contemplating the Combat Exclusion Rules
The concept of women in combat is subject to much contro-
versy. Many law review articles, books, and editorials have ex-
amined the issue.40 The issue pits feminists against exclusionists, 4 1
soldiers against soldiers,42 and even women against women.43
Combat exclusion is one of the leading topics in political and social
debate for several reasons. First, gender discrimination in employ-
ment remains a national problem, and the military is one of the na-
tion's largest employers. In many ways, the Armed Forces offer
35 See BINKIN & BACH, supra note 13, at 23.
36 Id
37 Id. at 25.
38 Id. at 28.
39 See BINKIN & BACH, supra note 13, at 30. "Contrary to widely held beliefs, the
major restrictions on the recruitment and functions assigned to women in the United
States military establishment are not explicitly incorporated in federal law.... More
limiting are the set of policies established by the military services ......
40 See generally G. Sidney Buchanan, Women in Combat. An Essay on Ultimate Rights and
Responsibilities, 28 Hous. L. REV. 503 (1991) (arguing that the combat exclusion laws are
unconstitutional); Dillingham, supra note 30, at 223 (evaluating whether the possibility
of women becoming prisoners of warjustifies the combat exclusions rules); Elizabeth V.
Gemmette, Armed Combat. The Women's Movement Mobilizes Troops in Readiness for the Inevita-
ble Constitutional Attack on the Combat Exclusion for Women in the Military, 12 WOMEN'S RTs. L.
REP. 89 (1990) (contrasting various feminists' views regarding women in the military
and the combat exclusion rules); Goodman, supra note 26, at 243 (demonstrating how
the combat exclusion rules generate sexual discrimination in the military); Kornblum,
supra note 26, at 351 (examining the combat exclusion rules and demonstrating how the
justifications for the rules are invalid); Jeanne M. Lieberman, Women in Combat, 37 FED.
BAR NEWS &J. 215 (1990) (discussing the role of women in the military and evaluating
the possibilities for change).
41 "Exclusionists," as Paul Roush defines them, are "those who want to exclude
military women from assignment to combat units." Paul E. Roush, The Exclusionists and
Their Message, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 163 (1990) (presenting and critiquing exclusionists'
claims). Other commentators refer to supporters of combat exclusion as traditionalists.
42 See, e.g., Ron Martz, Skirmishes in the Military: Former WACs Divided over Ban on Com-
bat, CHICAGO TRIB., May 31, 1992, at 5; Eric Schmitt, Ban on Women in Combat Divides Four
Service Chiefs, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 19, 1991, at A16.
43 See, e.g., Gemmette, supra note 40, at 90, 91 (discussing the different positions
among feminists concerning various issues among women in combat. Some feminists
argue that the military should recognize sex-based differences. However, other femi-
nists, such as assimilationists, disagree.); see also Jeff M. Tuten, The Argument Against Fe-
male Combatants, in FEMALE SOLDIERS, supra note 14, at 237, 252-54 (arguing that on some
issues regarding women in combat "feminists themselves are divided").
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women exceptional opportunities not easily matched in the civilian
world. For example, it provides women with opportunities to train
for careers that were traditionally male-dominated. 44 The military
also provides equal pay for equal work. In addition, veteran's pref-
erence, achieved through military service, helps women obtain civil
service jobs usually reserved for men.45
Second, the public always has considered combat service an
honor. Movies, novels, political speeches, and art have idolized
combat service. 46 Jill Goodman writes that "according to popular
conceptions about war, combat more than tests men; it tests them
under conditions at once compelling, exciting, and glamorous. The
vast literature on war attests to the fascination of combat .. .
Third, the opportunity to serve in combat relates to political
privilege. Many have equated women's exclusion from combat to
the discrimination African-Americans once experienced.48 For ex-
ample, in Dred Scott v. Sandford,49 Justice Taney reasoned that blacks
were not citizens because, in part, they could not serve in combat.
Although the Constitution recognizes women as citizens, opponents
of combat exclusion argue that political and social equality must in-
volve equal opportunity to serve one's country. Thus, "military ser-
vice is a means of establishing full political rights as well as an
essential political right in itself."'50
Fourth, the combat exclusion issue directly relates to women's
struggle for equal rights.5' Exclusionists argue that feminists use
"the military [as] their battlefield" in order to obtain equality.52
44 See, e.g., Patricia A. Gilmartin, Women Pilots' Performance in Desert Storm Helps Lift
Barriers in Military, Civilian Market, AViATON WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 13, 1992, at 63
("Expanded participation by women in nontraditional, combat flying roles would prove
that women can be successful in all aspects of aviation. It also would boost their career
prospects, since many airlines still prefer pilots with military training.").
45 See Buchanan, supra note 40, at 511-12; Goodman, supra note 26, at 245.
46 See Goodman, supra note 26, at 255.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 246; see Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the
Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499, 525 (1991).
Achieving full citizenship for women in America is going to require a lot
more than ending the exclusion of servicewomen from combat positions,
but those two goals are interrelated. As Frederick Douglass and W.E.B.
DuBois understood, the long-standing connection between military ser-
vice and full citizenship has centered not on uniforms but on weapons.
Id.
49 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 420 (1857).
50 See Goodman, supra note 26, at 247.
51 See Kornblum, supra note 26, at 378 ("The combat exclusion affects all women.
It reinforces women's political powerlessness in many different ways."); see also Good-
man, supra note 26, at 257 ("The combat restrictions are the cornerstone of the mili-
tary's discriminatory policies. Were the prohibitions on women in combat removed, the
entire system of unequal treatment would probably fall.").
52 Roush, supra note 41, at 168.
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They further contend that the combat exclusion issue is not about
equal opportunity but about national security.53 Exclusionists argue
that women's integration into combat service threatens that secur-
ity.5 4 In contrast, feminists argue that the Armed Forces and exclu-
sionists use the combat exclusion issue as a means to preserve the
inequality of women in the military. 55 According to feminists, this
issue implicates the following theories that serve to reinforce tradi-
tional stereotypes: that men need to protect women, that women
cannot be the aggressors, and that women's proper place is in the
home.56
C. Combat Exclusion Rules: Discrimination Against Both
Sexes
Combat exclusion discriminates against women both occupa-
tionally and economically. The military system treats men and wo-
men equally in terms of pay. As women climb the ranks, however,
they experience a "glass ceiling" similar to that experienced by wo-
men in the corporate world. 57 For example, many of the low-
ranking officer and enlistment promotions are automatic and deter-
mined by length of service. However, promotions to higher ranks,
such as noncommissioned officers (E-5 to E-9) and command of-
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., Tuten, supra note 43, at 248 ("Equal opportunity on the battlefield spells
defeat.");Jean Yarbrough, The Feminist Mistake: Sexual Equality and the Decline of theAmeri-
can Military, 38 POL'Y REV. 48, 52 (1985) (arguing that when equal opportunity is "ap-
plied to military affairs, it is wrong and dangerous.").
55 See Buchanan, supra note 40, at 544-45; Goodman, supra note 26, at 250-51;
Kornblum, supra note 26, at 378-82.
56 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 40, at 543; Goodman, supra note 26, at 260-64;
Michael Gordon, Military Chiefs Report Plans to Curb Sexual Harrassment, N.Y. TiMES, July
31, 1992, at A10 (demonstrating the protective nature of the top military leaders to-
wards women when discussing women in combat. General McPeak stated "I have a very
traditional attitude about wives and mothers and daughters being ordered to kill people."
Similarly General Mundy said that combat is "something that [he] would not want to see
women involved in.") (emphasis added); Francis Hamit, Soldier Girl: Is Her Future in Com-
bat?, DEF. NEWS, Sept. 17, 1990, at 31 ("[Ihe issue is more dependent upon cultural
perceptions and politics than on whether women can do the jobs required in a combat
environment."); Kornblum, supra note 26, at 385-90; see also United States v. Saint Clair,
291 F. Supp. 122, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (rationalizing why Congress did not include wo-
men in MSSA, the court noted that "Congress followed the teachings of history that if a
nation is to survive, men must provide the first line of defense while women keep the home
fires burning") (emphasis added).
57 See Lieberman, supra note 40, at 215. Lieberman discusses the plight of the fe-
male soldier:
[I]f she is ambitious, the Army opportunities begin to closely parallel the
civilian ones. The number of women who climb the corporate ladder be-
yond the intermediate rungs (and the price they pay) is not far removed
from the number of military women who greatly advance in rank (and the
price they pay).
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ficers (0-4 to 0-9), are based on a composite of factors: leadership
skills, test scores, and supervisors' recommendations.5 8 Deciding
who gains access to these high-ranking positions involves more sub-
jectivity. It is at this career stage that women find that the lack of
combat experience acts as a hindrance to their military futures by
limiting their opportunities for advancement. 59 The Supreme Court
recognized this disadvantage in Schlesinger v. Ballard.60 Although the
Court acknowledged that a different promotional track for women
existed, it ruled that the Navy's policy did not violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because female and male lieutenants were not simi-
larly situated. 61 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, reasoned
that:
in competing for promotion, female lieutenants will not generally
have compiled records of seagoing service comparable to those of
male lieutenants.... Congress may thus quite rationally have be-
lieved that women line officers had less opportunity for promo-
tion than did their male counterparts, and that longer period of
tenure for women officers would, therefore, be consistent with the
goal to provide women officers with "fair and equitable career ad-
vancement programs." 62
Due to combat exclusion, female officers suffer a related occu-
pational disadvantage in that they often have little opportunity to
engage in military decisionmaking. 63 This lack of opportunity af-
fects both female soldiers' credibility with their peers and their
chances for recognition by their superiors. 64 By denying women the
chance to participate in combat, the military is effectively denying
female soldiers the chance to prove themselves.
A closely related disadvantage is that when the military denies
female soldiers an opportunity to demonstrate their abilities, it
forces them into a stereotype that they cannot disprove.65 Argu-
ments that women are not effective leaders, that they are not aggres-
58 See MILrrARY WOMEN, supra note 32, at 29-31, 46.
59 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 56, at A10 (quoting General McPeak, "[combat ex-
clusion] works to their disadvantage in a career context."); see also Barbara Kantrowitz, et
al., The Right to Fight, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 1991, at 22.
60 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
61 Id. at 506.
62 Id. at 508 (citation omitted).
63 See, e.g., Kornblum, supra note 26, at 379.
64 See Lieberman, supra note 40, at 215 (Women are "seriously restricted in [their]
career credibility, [they have] no voice in this major decision about [their] qualifications,
capabilities, and potential.").
65 See Buchanan, supra note 40, at 544. "[E]xclusion of women from combat posi-
tions and the draft reinforces the 'us-them dichotomy' between men and women. The
exclusion reinforces 'traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of
men and women' in society." (quoting Mississippi Univ. of Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 726 (1982) (O'Connor, J.)).
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sive soldiers, or that they are sexual objects will remain
unchallenged as long as the combat exclusion rules exist.
Economically, the combat exclusion rules deny women the op-
portunity to earn more money because they cannot rise through the
ranks at the same rate as their male counterparts.6 6 Because the
length of service and the grade of rank determine military pay, wo-
men on the whole are destined to earn less than men.
Combat exclusion affects women's potential earnings outside of
the military as well. For example, because the Armed Forces do not
allow women to join in the same numbers as men, male veterans
continue to outnumber female veterans substantially. As the dissent
states in Personnel Administration of Massachusetts v. Feeney,67 veteran's
preference disadvantages females disproportionately when compet-
ing for governmental jobs. 68 In addition, due to their lower num-
bers as veterans, women are less likely to be eligible for the many
benefits that the government allots to veterans, such as educational
assistance, loans, and medical and insurance benefits.69
The combat exclusion rules also discriminate against men. Be-
cause of the rules, only men bear the burden of fighting wars, thus
possessing the greater risk of being killed, maimed, or captured.
Similarly, the military drafts only men in times of war.70 Men often
have argued that this burden is unfair.7 ' For example, several men
66 The Department of Defense noted that promotions were based on the following
factors: "inventory status (by grade, specialty or experience evel), resource constraints and
legislative or Defense guidance." MILITARY WOMEN, supra note 32, at 72 (emphasis
added).
67 442 U.S. 256 (1979). Justice Marshall argues, in his dissent, that:
the impact of the Massachusetts statute on women is undisputed. Any
veteran with a passing grade on the civil service exam must be placed
ahead ofa nonveteran, regardless of their respective scores. Because less
than 2%o of the women in Massachusetts are veterans, the absolute-
preference formula has rendered desirable state civil service employment
an almost exclusively male prerogative.
Id at 283 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
68 See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 26, at 245 ("Veteran's preference in public em-
ployment gives veterans at least an edge and often an easy victory in the competition for
civil service jobs.").
69 Id. at 245.
70 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Buchanan, supra note 40, at 508-09;
Kornblum, supra note 26, at 382-83. Kornblum writes that:
The combat exclusion [rule] unfairly burdens men as a group.... For
example, in the event of a military draft, even men who believe in non-
violent conflict resolution and abhor militaristic values would be pres-
sured to fight. Conversely, even women who wish to fight would be ex-
cluded from a draft and from combat. Men who do not wish to fight
would suffer, solely because they are men, if they refuse to participate in
the military or in combat.
Id. at 382.
71 Men have opposed recent changes in the, combat exclusion rules because such
changes allow women, unlike men, to choose whether they want combat roles. These men
260 [Vol. 78:252
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have brought lawsuits in which they claim that involuntary registra-
tion and induction violated their rights under the Equal Protection
Clause.72
D. Justifications for the Combat Exclusion Rules
The combat exclusion rules have two main justifications: the
need to maintain national security and the need to protect women.
Exclusionists criticize feminists and "opportunistic" female officers
for promoting the concept of women in combat as a means for se-
curing equal rights for women while ignoring the countervailing is-
sue of national security.73 For exclusionists, combat exclusion rules
are not about equal opportunity but about national security.74 Ex-
clusionists see women in combat as "an unprecedented social exper-
iment with alarming potentially disastrous effects on national
security."'75 They believe that women in combat would adversely
affect national security by decreasing combat effectiveness.
have little sympathy for the arguments that opponents of the combat exclusion rules
propose. One male responded that:
[p]revious wars have shown-through conscription-that killing, in terms
of combat, is more a matter of those who have to kill as opposed to those
who want to kill. Thus, for all the killing that [opponents to combat ex-
clusion want] to see other women volunteer for, why are young American
men still vulnerable to the draft?
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1991, at B5.
72 See, e.g., United States v. Dorris, 319 F. Supp. 1306, 1308 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (re-
sponding to the defendant's argument that the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA)
was discriminatory in that it excepted females, the court applied the compelling govern-
mental interest test and held that the government had a compelling interest to "maxi-
mize efficiency and minimize expense of raising an army") (quoting United States v.
Fallon, 407 F.2d 621, 623 (7th Cir. 1969)); United States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618, 622
(W.D. Pa. 1970) (holding that the classification was rationally related to the govern-
ment's interest in "establish[ing] and maintain[ing] armed forces of males which may at
least physically be equal to the armed forces of other nations, likewise composed of
males, with which it must compete."); United States v. Saint Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122, 125
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (ruling that the MSSA was constitutional because the classification was
rationally related to its goal of maintaining an effective fighting force).
73 See, e.g., Tuten, supra note 43, at 263 ("[C]ombat readiness should take priority
over feminist desire for full equality even on the battlefield."); Yarbrough, supra note 54,
at 50 ("Pressure for change comes most from the female junior officers whose careers
are most directly affected by the combat exclusion policy.").
74 See Roush, supra note 41, at 169-70; Tuten, supra note 43, at 261.
If the primary purpose were to provide jobs on an equal opportunity ba-
sis, then the answer would be to press on and grant women full warrior
status. But, the primary function of the U.S. armed services is to provide
for the common defense-not to redress perceived social and sexual ine-
qualities in our society. More bluntly-the primary function of the military
service is to defend American society, not to change it.
1d.
75 Phyllis Schlafly, Women in Military Combat? What it Means for American Culture and
Defense, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., June 3, 1991, at 109; see Tuten, supra note 43, at 261
("To the extent that we use the military as a testbed for social experimentation we risk
the security of the nation.").
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1. Physical Requirements
In arguing that women in combat would adversely affect combat
readiness, exclusionists cite three gender-related biological differ-
ences: lowered physical capabilities, 76 pregnancy,77 and menstrua-
tion.78 First, they believe that women are weaker than men,79 and
thus are unable to perform the rigorous duties of a conventional
combat soldier. 80 Second, exclusionists argue that women's repro-
ductive capabilities would affect their ability to perform as combat
soldiers. "Lost time is an important aspect of the whole readiness
issue. The exclusionists like to talk about pregnancy and single
parenting as prime sources of lost time." 81 Menstruation and preg-
nancy, they argue, have no place on the battlefield.82
Opponents of combat exclusion rules challenge these argu-
ments. First, they claim that, while physical strength is important,
describing combat in terms of rigorous hand-to-hand combat is no
longer accurate.8 3 They reason that because contemporary weap-
ons are more technical, soldiers utilize their mental skills more than
their physical skills. 84 Second, opponents of combat exclusion ar-
gue that physical differences between genders do not justify exclud-
ing all women from combat, especially if some women can improve
their strength through physical conditioning.8 5 Third, opponents to
76 See, e.g., Roush, supra note 41, at 163-64; see also Tuten, supra note 43, at 248
(arguing that women's lowered physical capabilities alone are enough to exclude women
from combat).
77 See, e.g., Roush, supra note 41, at 167; see also Yarbrough, supra note 54, at 52
(suggesting that pregnancy "creates problems of lost time, child care, and
deployability.").
78 See, e.g., Gemmette, supra note 40, at 91-92 (discussing premenstrual stress
syndrome).
79 According to a background study by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense, "[w]omen have about 67% of the endurance of men and 55% of the muscular
strength of men." OFFICE OF THE AssrrANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, USE OF WOMEN IN
THE MILrARY 26 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter USE OF WOMEN].
80 Gemmette, supra note 40, at 92-93; see Kornblum, supra note 26, at 409-10;
Roush, supra note 41, at 163-64; Tuten, supra note 43, at 247-51.
81 Roush, supra note 41, at 167.
82 See, e.g., SchIafly, supra note 75, at 108 ("Pregnancy and motherhood are simply
not compatible with military service. It is wrong to pretend that a woman who is preg-
nant or has a baby is ready to ship out to fight war. She is not ready, and she should not
be paid as though she were ready."); Tuten, supra note 43, at 251 (suggesting that some
women would intentionally get pregnant to avoid deployment).
83 See Kornblum, supra note 26, at 410-14.
84 See, e.g., Elaine T. May, Women in the Wild Blue Yonder, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1991, at
A21 ("[T]hese women would be flying planes, not lifting them. And with sophisticated
weaponry, women can push the buttons to drop the bombs as easily as men can."). But
cf Yarbrough, supra note 54, at 52 ("[V]ictory will depend more on traditional infantry
stamina than sophisticated weapons.").
85 See, e.g., Kornblum, supra note 26, at 415-16 (arguing that the military should
focus on training women effectively instead of noting female soldiers' deficiencies with-
out proper training). But cf Tuten, supra note 43, at 247 ("It should be noted that...
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the rules stress that arguments based on disparities in physical
strength are less convincing when focusing on mixed crews com-
prised of male and female soldiers.8 6 Fourth, opponents respond to
exclusionists' concerns about female reproductive capabilities by ar-
guing that it is unfair to deny all women the opportunity to engage
in combat because some women get pregnant while in service.87 In
response to the lost time issue, opponents argue that pregnant fe-
male soldiers are absent for only a short period of time, and, on
average, male soldiers are more apt to be absent than women. 88 For
example, the Department of the Navy reported that male soldiers
were absent from duty almost twice as often as female soldiers. 89
2. Psychological Requirements
In terms of psychological differences, exclusionists seek to jus-
tify the combat exclusion rules by arguing that women do not have
the capacity to be aggressors. 90 In order to be an effective combat
soldier, they argue, one must not only defend oneself, but also at-
tack one's enemy.91 Women, according to exclusionists, thrive on
caring and nurturing; it is against their moral make-up to kill peo-
ple.92 Exclusionists also argue that because women are unable to
handle pressure as well as men, they would shrink from their duty in
male physical advantages are genetic-no amount of physical conditioning will change
them.").
86 See Gemmette, supra note 40, at 93. ("It might be presuasive to de-emphasize the
differences between men and women and instead emphasize the usefulness of the reci-
procity of different skills provided by mixed crews."). But cf. Yarbrough, supra note 54,
at 51 ("Although it is true that many military tasks require teamwork rather than virtusio
displays of physical strength, it is not so clear that men will cooperate with women as
readily as men.").
87 See Marily A. Gordon & MaryJ. Ludvigson, The Combat Exclusion for Women Avia-
tors: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 171, 181 (1990). But see Gemmette, supra
note 40, at 91 (noting that feminists are divided on the pregnancy issue: some recognize
that there are major concerns that could affect the military's decision to allow women in
combat, and others do not believe that the pregnancy issue should exclude all women
from combat).
88 See UsE or WOMEN, supra note 79, at 28 ("Even though pregnancy is the major
cause of lost time among women, they lose, on the average, only about half as much time
as men.").
89 See BINKIN & BACH, supra note 13, at 62-64.
90 See Roush, supra note 41, at 166-67 (describing exclusionists' concerns). See also
Tuten, supra note 43, at 254-55 (suggesting that aggressiveness might be linked to cul-
tural conditioning or to male hormones. "That the male of the species is more combat-
ive is a fact of life in contemporary society. . . . Even if female submissiveness is
nongenetic and nonchemical... the fact remains that women are less aggressive.").
91 See, e.g., Tuten, supra note 43, at 255 ("[Clombativeness and aggressiveness are
necessary traits in the combat soldier.").
92 See, e.g., May, supra note 84, at A21.
The combat barrier somehow seems different, more ominous than other
rights gained by women. Not because it marks the invasion of women
into one of the few remaining bastions of masculinity, but because it
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stressful situations. 93 They theorize that women would lose their
composure on the battlefield and either break down and cry or
abandon their posts. 94 Combat effectiveness would be diminished
because male soldiers would have to compensate for female
soldiers. 95 According to Paul Roush, Brian Mitchell, a well-known
exclusionist, believes that women in combat are "psychologically
unfit. They are not as aggressive as men. They are less daring.
They are better suited for the more tedious, routine tasks-tasks
that require little imagination." 96
Opponents argue that, in modem warfare, face-to-face combat
is obsolete since most soldiers are miles away from their targets
when an attack begins.97 In addition, they claim that exclusionists'
theories are generalizations based on societal conceptions of the
proper role of women. 98 None of the theories have actually been
substantiated. In fact, studies show that women perform well in
mock combat battles.99 Finally, opponents argue that men are also
susceptible to battle stress. 100 In past wars, military doctors have
treated combat soldiers suffering from shell shock-post-traumatic
stress disorders (PTSD).10 l For example, during the Vietnam War,
the military reported PTSD in record numbers.1 02
threatens what is perhaps the sole surviving gender myth of the 20th cen-
tury: that women are the world's nurturers.
Id.
93 See Goodman, supra note 26, at 261; Gordon & Ludvigson, supra note 87, at 181;
see also Tuten, supra note 43, at 252 (arguing that, since it is impossible to simulate com-
bat stress, integration of women risks impeding combat effectiveness).
94 Exclusionists point to an incident during the Panama invasion to illustrate the
"typical female emotional state." During the invasion, two female truck drivers, whose
duties were to transport troops into combat zones, were relieved of their posts when
they suffered breakdowns. See Robert H. Knight et al., Women in Combat: Why Rush to
Judgment, HERITAGE FOUND. REP.,June 14, 1991, available in LEXIs, Nexis Library, Currnt
File.
95 See Yarbrough, supra note 54, at 50 (noting that when male soliders compensate
for female soldiers it leads to lower morale because of resentment).
96 Roush, supra note 41, at 163 (paraphrasing BRIAN MITCHELL, WEAK LINK: THE
FEMINIZATION OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY 188 (1989)).
97 See Gordon & Ludvigson, supra note 87, at 181-82; Kornblum, supra note 26,406-
08; Roush, supra note 41, at 164-65.
98 See Kornblum, supra note 26, at 407 ("Finally, even if women were not aggressive
enough, their lack of aggression is due more to social and cultural conditioning than
innate characteristics.").
99 See U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVORIAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES,
WOMEN COMBAT IN UNIT FORCE DEVELOPMENT TEST (1977); WOMEN CONTENT IN THE
ARMY-REFORGER 77; STUDY (REF-WAC 77) AND EVALUATION OF WOMEN IN THE ARMY
(EwITA) STUDY (1977).
100 See Lieberman, supra note 40, at 219.
101 See id. at 219.
102 Id.
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3. Cohesion
Exclusionists argue that women would adversely affect national
security by disrupting the much needed cohesion in a combat
unit.103 Male soldiers value the "nonerotic psychological bond-
ing"10 4 that exists between their squads or platoons. This bonding
instills a measure of loyalty within combat soldiers that a woman's
presence, exclusionists contend, would disrupt. In peacetime, this
disruption would be a nuisance, but in wartime, it could impede the
performance of a combat unit.105
According to exclusionists, if the Armed Forces were to allow
women into combat units, cohesion would be adversely affected in
three ways. First, sexual attraction between male and female
soldiers would interfere with the bonding of a unit, thereby destroy-
ing group cohesion.1 06 Due to sexual integration, men would no
longer develop bonding relationships; instead, they would view
themselves as rivals in a sexual contest. 10 7 The end result, exclu-
sionists conclude, is that the unit would perform less efficiently.10 8
To illustrate, exclusionists point to the Persian Gulf War media re-
ports of incidents of prostitution by female soldiers' 0 9 and
pregnancies aboard the mixed-crew ship Arcadia."10
Second, exclusionists argue that the differences in treatment
between male and female soldiers would destroy the bonding of a
combat unit. Bonding, they claim, is created through uniformity-
103 See Kornblum, supra note 26, at 420-25; Roush, supra note 41, at 166-67; LaurieJ.
Sanderson-Walcott, The Army's Combat Exclusion: An Update, 16 W. ST. UNiv. L. REv. 665,
672 (1989).
104 See, e.g., Roush, supra note 41, at 166; see also Kirk Spitzer, Male Bonding, Ground
Combat: Are Women Up to it?, GANNETr NEWS SERV., July 5, 1992, available in LEmxs, Nexis
Library, Currnt File (quoting Maj. Gen. Gene Deegan saying that "many of the factors
that lead to success on the battlefield are intangible and difficult to quantify. The most
important of those characteristics ... is the 'bonding' that occurs between infantrymen
who share the hardships ....").
105 See, e.g., Knight et al., supra note 94 (examining the historical significance of Is-
raeli's experience with women in combat and concluding that "[m]en moved to protect
the women members of the unit instead of carrying out the mission of the unit.").
106 See, e.g., Brian Green, Women in Combat: The Question Isn't If They'll Be Shot At-It's
Whether They Can Shoot Back, AIR FORCE MAG., June 1990, at 76 ("Would the presence of
women in a predominantly male combat unit undercut its cohesion and therefore its
performance? Traditionalists say yes, arguing that social relationships between men and
women would create jealousies and sexual tensions.").
107 See, e.g., Gemmette, supra note 40, at 93 ("sexual attraction between men and
women is as likely to destroy camaraderie as it is to produce constant dissention among
men in a group.") (quoting Seth Cropsey, Women in Combat?, 61 PUB. INTEREST 58, 72
(1980)).
108 See, e.g., BINKIN & BACH, supra note 13, at 90 (arguing that integrating women in
units "with a machismo image" might "disrupt[] group cohesion and, hence, combat
effectiveness").
109 See Kantrowitz, supra note 59, at 23.
110 Id.
1993] 265
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
soldiers experiencing similar situations under similar conditions.
They contend that "[e]ven the smallest difference ... disrupts the
bonding that's needed to survive in battle."11
Third, exclusionists believe that women "do not bond with one
another or with men."'1 12 Their concern is that, by integrating wo-
men into combat units, men would lose their ability to bond. 113
They believe that female soldiers' presence in a combat unit would
"destroy[] the possibility of bonding for the men and lead[] to
physic emasculation, stifling of masculinity, and even sterilization of
the whole process of combat leadership."'1 14
In response, opponents of combat exclusion argue that similar
occupations, such as policemen or firemen, have mixed units and
still perform effectively. 15 That is, the presence of women does not
always disrupt group cohesion. If a lack of bonding exists, they ar-
gue that it is not female soldiers' incapacity to bond but male
soldiers' perceptions about female soldiers that lead to the destruc-
tion of camaraderie between men and women.1 16 Combat exclusion
instills a belief that women are not equal to men. This inequality
leads to disrespect and resentment of women that often leads to
overt hostility. 117 The recent Tailhook scandal illustrates this phe-
nomenon. One of the most disturbing aspects of the scandal was
that many of the sailors participating believed that "drunken gangs
... shov[ing] terrified women down the gauntlet, grabbing at their
breasts and buttocks and stripping off their clothes" 118 constituted
"acceptable social conduct." 119
111 Spitzer, supra note 104.
112 See Roush, supra note 41, at 166.
113 See id. at 166-67.
114 Id. at 166 (describing exclusionists' views about women in combat units).
115 See, e.g., BINKIN & BACH, supra note 13, at 91 ("It is becoming increasingly diffi-
cult.., to reconcile this hypothesis [about women destroying male bonding] with the
mounting evidence of women's prominent role in terrorist and guerrilla groups, in
which strong patterns of male-bonding would be expected to exist."); Gemmette, supra
note 40, at 94 ("Evidence tends to show that this is not the case in sexually integrated
police forces.").
116 See, e.g., Kornblum, supra note 26, at 424 ("As long as leaders continue to empha-
size women's presumed weaknesses and as long as men relate male sexuality to men's
-domination of women, military men will continue to compete against military women to
the detriment of men's combat effectiveness. This problem is men's problem, not wo-
men's.") (emphasis added).
117 See Eric Schmitt, Wall of Silence Impedes Inquiry into a Rowdy Navy Convention, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 1992, at Al.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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4. Economics
Exclusionists also offer economic justifications for the combat
exclusion rules. First, they argue that including women in combat
units would be costly because the military would have to modify fa-
cilities, such as ships and barracks, in order to provide privacy for
the soldiers. 120 The military would also have to modify equipment
in order to accommodate women. Currently, the military designs
their equipment based on the average "anthropometric dimen-
sions" of a male soldier. 121 Exclusionists argue that adaptions could
be very expensive because "[s]eemingly minor variations of a few
centimeters in the essential dimensions ... may be critical determi-
nants in the efficient and safe usage of vehicles and vehicular subsys-
tems, controls, instrument panels, displays, etc. and in the adequate
accommodation of some clothing and protective gear."' 122
Second, exclusionists believe that the cost incurred in training
women will be ill-spent. 123 They argue that the military trains wo-
men at great expense only to have them leave the military service,
either because of pregnancy or a desire to capitalize on their newly
acquired skills in the civilian world. 124
Third, exclusionists argue that since the military is downsizing,
expanding women's role is not cost effective. They contend that be-
cause men make the "better soldier," providing quotas for women
into combat positions would not be in the best interest of the mili-
tary.' 25 California Representative Robert Dornan "predict[ed] that
coming cuts in the size of the U.S. military will doom any expansion
of women's roles.' 126
Opponents of the combat rules counter that any additional
costs associated with changing facilities would be reflected in one-
time expenditures and would not constitute an ongoing burden. 127
In addition, the military already calculates some expenses, such as
uniform modifications, into the military budget. 128 Opponents also
120 See BINKIN & BACH, supra note 13, at 53-54.
121 IME at 54.
122 Id- at 54-55 (citation omitted).
123 According to military sources, it costs 6 million dollars to train an F-16 pilot.
Hackworth, supra note 4, at 28. "If a woman pilot becomes pregnant she doesn't fly. If
war comes along, a unit is missing a pilot, and after the baby, that pilot must requalify."
Id- at 28.
124 See Tuten, supra note 43, at 250-51.
125 See Kantrowitz, supra note 59, at 22.
126 Id. at 23.
127 See BINKIN & BACH, supra note 13, at 53.
128 Gemmette, supra note 40, at 97-98.
As well as costs associated with privacy rights for women in combat, there
are other increased costs for uniform modification and for medical ex-
penses due to pregnancy; but these costs, like costs for separate facilities
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argue that some women leave military service, because they do not
have the same opportunities as men. If given the chance, women
would be willing to make sacrifices in order to obtain the training
and have the opportunity to utilize it.129
5. Protection of Women
Besides national security concerns, another justification for the
combat exclusion rules is the protection of women.' 30 The legisla-
tive history of the combat exclusion rules shows that Congress
wanted to protect women from the harsh realities of war. l3 ' Exclud-
ing women from combat decreases their risk of being captured, in-
jured, or killed. Exclusionists believe that, instead of fighting,
women should be at home. 132 Their vital function is to maintain the
homefront. 133 The implication is that by protecting the family, wo-
men are doing their appropriate part in protecting America.
Opponents point out that the combat exclusion rules do not
adequately decrease female soldiers' risks. 134 Despite the existence
for men and women, have already been incorporated in military
spending.
Id.
129 For example, Captain Troy Devine submits to mandatory pregnancy tests every
two weeks and agreed not to become pregnant for at least one year in order for the Air
Force to protect its investment in training her as a spy plane pilot. It costs more than a
half millon dollars to train Captain Devine. Kantrowitz, supra note 59, at 23.
13O See, e.g., Green, supra note 106, at 78 ("The 1988 Department of Defense Task
Force on Women in the Military found that policies serving to exclude women from
combat reflect society's cultural standards and Congress's desire to 'protect women
from the most serious risks of harm or capture.' ").
131 S. REP. No. 567, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); H.R. REP. No. 1616, 80th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1948).
132 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. See Kornblum, supra note 26, at
378 (quotingJoHN LAFFIN, WOMEN IN BATTLE 185 (1967)).
Laffin argued that allowing women into combat would destroy men's incentives to
fight wars.
One of the great inducements to the end of a war is the intense desire of
men to return home to women and bed. If a man is to have women at war
with him, is he to think of women as comarades-in-arms rather than as
mistresses-on-mattress the inducement disappears. In the first place he
can have what he needs without going home and in the second he is apt
not to feel the need.
Id.
133 See Schlafly, supra note 75, at 6-7 (arguing that the idea of men sending mothers
to war "is contrary to our culture, to our respect for men and women, and to our belief
in the importance of the family and motherhood.").
134 See, e.g., Green, supra note 106, at 78 (noting the arguments of Former Secretary
of the Army Clifford L. Alexander that "[combat] exclusion not only fails to protect
women, but also weakens military effectiveness because the services are prevented from
taking full advantage of the high skills of women troops.").
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of combat exclusion rules, women get captured, 35 shot at, 136 and
killed.' 3 7 The real difference between male and female soldiers is
that female soldiers cannot capture, shoot, or kill offensively.' 3 8
Opponents to combat exclusion also argue that being a soldier
and being a mother can be compatible. 39 Family issues concern
both genders. The military, opponents believe, could be the first to
discredit the stereotype that women are solely responsible for child-
care.' 40 In addition, opponents argue that women should be able to
decide how they will handle their own personal commitments.
E. Methods of Change
Three possible methods for changing the combat exclusion
rules exist.' 4 ' First, the President could nullify the laws by Execu-
tive Order. For example, in 1948, President Truman desegregated
the Armed Forces by Executive Order. 42 Although Former Presi-
dent Bush is an ardent supporter of combat exclusion, 43 President
Clinton has not set forth his position on women in combat.' 44 He
did commit, however, to reviewing the issue after the Presidential
Commission officially reports its findings to Congress. 145
Second, Congress could repeal or modify the combat exclusion
laws. In fact, Congress did modify the laws by allowing the Armed
Forces, at their discretion, to permit female pilots to fly on combat
missions. 146 Congress also created a Presidential Commission to
135 Iraqi soldiers captured two female soliders during the Persian Gulf War. CHI-
CAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 29, 1991, at Cl.
136 See, e.g., Jeannie Ralston, We liberated Kuwait in six weeks. How long will it take to
liberate the military?, LIFE, May 1991, at 52 (reporting that female soliders, such as Lt.
Jeter who worked at a Patriot missile control trailer, were subjected to scud missile at-
tacks the same as men).
137 Thirteen women were killed in the Gulf War.
138 See Goodman, supra note 26, at 260 ("Women defending the home is an accepta-
ble idea; women conquering the world is not."); Kornblum, supra note 26, at 397-98.
139 See Gemmette, supra note 40, at 98.
140 See, e.g., Kornblum, supra note 26, at 420 ("Misguided attitudes towards
childbearing itself distort reality and perpetuate myths about military women's
effectiveness.").
141 See generally Michael F. Noone, Jr., Women in Combat: Changing the Rules, 39 NAVAL
L. REV. 187 (1990) (analyzing the strategies that each branch could use to change the
combat exclusion rule).
142 Exec. Order No. 9981 (1948).
143 See Gellman, Senate Panel, supra note 9, at A4.
144 See Barton Gellman, Panel Seeks to Limit Women in Combat, WAsH. PosT, Nov. 4,
1992, at A3.
145 Id.
146 See S. Res. 8549, supra note 6, at S12417 (expressing the intent of Congress to
permit women to fly combat missions).
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study the possible effects on combat readiness if women were al-
lowed into combat units.1 47
Third, the Supreme Court could declare the combat exclusion
rules unconstitutional. Though many scholars have contended that
the rules are unconstitutional, they are skeptical that the Supreme
Court would actually declare them so. 148 In order to analyze prop-
erly the Supreme Court's probable reaction to the combat exclusion
issue, it is important to review military-related gender discrimina-
tion cases that the Court decided.
II
ANALYSIS OF MILITARY-RELATED GENDER
DISCRIMINATION CASES
A. Frontiero, Schlesinger, and Rostker
One of the first military-related gender discrimination cases
that the Supreme Court decided was Frontiero v. Richardson.'49 In
Frontiero, the Court declared that a federal statute was unconstitu-
tional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause.' 50 The stat-
ute at issue allowed male soldiers automatic approval of dependent
status for their wives. For female soldiers, however, approval of the
dependent status for their husbands was subject to a determination
of actual dependency. The Court held that gender was a suspect
class, requiring heightened judicial scrutiny when courts reviewed
the rationales behind laws based on gender classifications.15'
147 The recommendations of the Commission came as a major disappointment to
many supporters of women in combat. Although the recommendations of the nine-man,
six-women panel are nonbinding, the six-month, four million dollar study may adversely
affect the campaign towards women in combat. The fifteen-member commission, mainly
comprised of conservative members, recommended that Congress should reinstate the
ban on women in combat. Although it stated that women should be allowed to serve on
some combatant ships, the commission believed that women should not be allowed to
fly combat aircrafts. The commission's rationales mirror exclusionists justifications for
the combat exclusion rules. See generally Michael R. Gordon, Panel is Against Letting Women
Fly in Combat. Commission also Rejects Ground-Fighting Role, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at
A24 (reporting that "in a debate that often appeared to turn more on social policy than
military considerations, conservative panel members argued that it was wrong to allow
women to kill"); Thomas E. Ricks, Panel Recommends Women Not Serve on Combat Duty,
WALL ST.J., Nov. 4, 1992, at A4 (quoting one of the female commissioners who oppose
women in combat: "There are women who are willing to kill or be killed to achieve so-
called equal opportunity.... That is degrading to women and to society at large.").
148 "There are three possible conditions that would cause the combat exclusion laws
to be changed. The least probable of these is that the Supreme Court will change its
views regarding the permissible ways that Congress and the Executive may regulate the
internal affairs of the armed forces." Noone, supra note 141, at 195.
149 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
150 Id. at 688.
151 Id.
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Many commentators believed that Frontiero was a triumph for
women and that it would lead to a new wave of recognition of wo-
men's rights.1 52 This euphoria, however, was short-lived. The case
has had no real precedential value in determining other gender dis-
crimination cases for two reasons.' 53 First, the political makeup of
the Court's membership changed. Frontiero was "the last gasp of the
Warren majority."' 154 As the Court became more conservative, the
view of gender as a suspect class became less influential. 155 Second,
in cases subsequent to Frontiero, the Supreme Court began deferring
more to Congress and to internal military regulation in military af-
fairs.' 56 In Frontiero, the Court did not discuss the degree of defer-
ence to be granted to Congress on military matters. Though at that
time the concept of granting deference to Congress in military mat-
ters was not new,' 57 it garnered less influence than it would in sub-
sequent years.
The next Supreme Court case on military-related gender dis-
crimination was Schlesinger v. Ballard.'58 Unlike Frontiero, Schlesinger
involved a male plaintiff who claimed that the Navy's promotion pol-
icy was discriminatory.' 59 Ballard was a lieutenant in the Navy for
nine years before he became subject to mandatory discharge under
section 6382 of title 10 of the United States Code. 160 Female naval
officers, however, are not subject to section 6382.161 Instead, under
section 6401, female officers may hold the grade of lieutenant for
thirteen years before becoming subject to mandatory discharge. 162
The Court held that section 6382 does not violate due process
by discriminating in favor of women.' 63 The majority applied a ra-
tional relation test in analyzing the governmental interests involved:
152 See, e.g., Noone, supra note 141, at 192 ("Frontiero never achieved the preceden-
tial value that supporters of equal rights of females in the armed forces had hoped.").
153 Id.
154 Id. at 192.
155 Id. at 193.
156 Id.
157 For example, Chief Justice Warren also supported granting wide deference to
the military. In a speech, he stated that "courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact
upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have. Many
of the problems of the military society are, in a sense, alien to the problems with which
the judiciary is trained to deal." Barney F. Bilello, Note, Judicial Review and Soliders'
Rights: Is the Principle of Deference a Standard of Review?, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 465, 477
(1989) (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181,
187 (1962)).
158 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
159 Id. at 499-500.
160 10 U.S.C. 6382 (1956) (repealed 1980).
161 10 U.S.C. 6401 (1956) (repealed 1980).
162 Id.
163 Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508-10.
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Thus, in competing for promotion, female lieutenants will not
generally have compiled records of seagoing service comparable
to those of male lieutenants. In enacting and retaining § 6401,
Congress may thus quite rationally have believed that women line
officers had less opportunity for promotion than did their male
counterparts, and that a longer period of tenure for women of-
ficers would, therefore, be consistent with the goal to provide wo-
men officers with "fair and equitable career advancement
programs."164
The dissent in Schlesinger was comprised of most of Frontiero's
majority. 16 5 The dissent argued that no legislative history existed
which demonstrated Congress' intention to eliminate inequities that
female officers suffer because of the promotional system.1 66 The
dissent also objected to the deference that the Court granted to the
military. Justice Brennan argued:
As Frontiero v. Richardson illustrates, the fact that an equal protec-
tion claim arises from statutes concerning military personnel pol-
icy does not itself mandate deference to the congressional
determination, at least if the sex-based classification is not itself
relevant to and justified by the military purposes. 167
In 1981, the Court decided the next military-related gender dis-
crimination case, Rostker v. Goldberg.168 Rostker differs from Frontiero
and Schlesinger in three important ways. First, Rostker was the first
military-related gender discrimination case decided after Craig v. Bo-
ren. 169 In Craig v. Boren, the Supreme Court declared an Oklahoma
law unconstitutional because it authorized the sale of beer to eight-
een year-old women but not to eighteen year-old men.1 70 The Craig
decision established the current test used in analyzing gender classi-
fications: the important governmental interest/substantial relation-
ship test.1 71 Though not as strict as the standard used in analyzing
racial and other suspect classifications, the intermediate level of re-
view requires that the government prove that gender classifications
"serve important governmental objectives and [are] substantially re-
lated to the achievement of those objectives."' 172
164 Id. at 508 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
165 Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall dissented from the judgment in
Schlesinger.
166 Schlesinger, 419 U.S. 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167 Id. (citation omitted).
168 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
169 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
170 Id. at 204, 210.
171 See generally JOHN E. NOWAK, ET AL., CONsTrrurroNAL LAW 670 (3rd ed. 1986) ("A
majority of the justices now had agreed upon a specific definition for the intermediate
level of review applied in gender discrimination cases.").
172 Id. at 670.
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Second, Rostker involved traditional military issues whereas
Frontiero and Schlesinger dealt with nonmilitary, administrative em-
ployment issues.' 73 Because the Court viewed the conscription is-
sue as involving a military decision as opposed to a bureaucratic
decision, the focus of its opinion is different. 174 Ann Scales notes
that there is a distinction "between war-making decisions and non-
war-making decisions. Civilian judges can review the latter but very
seldom the former."' 175
Third, the Rostker majority granted a higher degree of defer-
ence to Congress than either Frontiero or Schlesinger.176 Before
Rostker, the Court had never stated its position on the amount of
deference courts should grant to Congress when analyzing constitu-
tional claims regarding the military.' 7 7 In Rostker, however, the
Court states its position in clear terms:
Nor can it be denied that the imposing number of cases from
this Court... suggest that judicial deference to ... congressional
exercise of authority is at its apogee when legislative action under
the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make
rules and regulations for their governance is challenged. 178
Notwithstanding its position that Congress should be granted
maximum deference in military affairs, the Court did note that con-
gressional actions involving the military are not above review:
None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard the
Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs. In that
area, as any other, Congress remains subject to the limitations of
the Due Process Clause ... [b]ut the tests and limitations to be
applied may differ because of the military context. 179
The issue in Rostker was whether requiring only men to register
for the draft violated the Fifth Amendment. 80 The male plaintiffs
brought an action following Congress' refusal to allow females to
register under the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA).' 8s The
173 See, e.g., Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as
Oxymoron, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 38-39 (1989).
174 Id. at 39.
175 Id. (emphasis added).
176 See Lieberman, supra note 40, at 216-17.
177 Gabriel W. Gorenstein, NoteJudicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against the Mili-
tary, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 387, 390 (1984) ("Judicial treatment of military claims has not
followed one consistent path. The Supreme Court has not offered explicit guidance as
to the appropriate standard to be used to determine when the merits of a claim against
the military should be reached.").
178 Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70.
179 Id. at 67 (citations omitted).
180 Id. at 59.
181 Id. at 61.
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district court, applying the Craig test, held that the Act was unconsti-
tutional and enjoined its implementation. 18 2
The Supreme Court reversed, relying heavily upon three fac-
tors. First, the Court used the combat exclusion rules to justify its
opinion. 8 3 Being careful to avoid the constitutionality issue of the
combat exclusion rules, the Court reasoned that the government's
interest in not including women in the draft was related to its goal of
manning the Armed Forces; the purpose of the draft was to ensure
that the military had enough soldiers to fight. 184 The Court, agree-
ing with Congress, stated that "registration serves no purpose be-
yond providing a pool for the draft."' 1 5 Because of the combat
exclusion rules, the Court reasoned that no need existed to register
women.'8 6 Second, the Court noted that Congress had held several
hearings on this subject and had reached its decision after a rea-
soned analysis of the best alternative.' 8 7 Third, the Court granted
maximum deference to the military. The Court noted that although
it usually grants "customary deference" to Congress, when the issue
involves military affairs, deference is magnified. 8s Deference, cou-
pled with a weakened Craig test, enabled the Court to hold the
MSSA constitutional. 189
Although the Court emphasized that it was not abdicating its
judicial role by deferring to Congress, 190 the dissent thought other-
wise. 191 As Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent, allowing fe-
males to register would not substantially impede the goal of
manning the Armed Forces. 192 He concluded that "the Court sub-
stitutes hollow shibboleths about 'deference to legislative decisions'
for constitutional analysis. It is as if the majority has lost sight of the
fact that 'it is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution.' "193
B. Comparison of the Combat Exclusion Issue to Military-
Related Gender Discrimination Cases
With the analysis of the preceding cases as a background, the
next step is to demonstrate how the combat exclusion issue differs
182 Id. at 63.
183 Id. at 78.
184 Id. at 75-76.
185 Id. at 75.
186 Id. at 78.
187 Id at 81-82.
188 Id. at 70.
189 Id. at 78-79, 83.
190 Id. at 70.
191 Id. at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192 Id.
193 Id. (citations omitted).
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from those addressed by the Court in other military-related gender
discrimination cases. The difference between the issue of whether
combat exclusion is unconstitutional and the issues discussed above
is one of context. Both Frontiero and Schlesinger dealt with constitu-
tional issues that were essentially of a nonmilitary, employment-
related nature. 194 As stated earlier, Rostker was, to some extent,
dealing with a traditional military issue. 195 Rostker, however, is dis-
tinguishable from the combat exclusion issue. Although the Rostker
judgment may affect the military, the issue of whether women
should register for the draft was mainly an administrative matter.
Even the plaintiffs in that case acknowledged that the Rostker issue
was not a military matter but rather one of administrative conven-
ience. 196 One might argue that the combat exclusion issue is also an
administrative matter because it involves employment discrimina-
tion. This argument, however, is weak because the issue involves
not only the composition of the Armed Forces, but also training and
sensitive military matters. Jill Goodman, in discussing the combat
exclusion issue, writes:
A challenge to the combat exclusion would present more dif-
ficulties than other military cases might. The question of who
should fight wars can be seen as going to the heart of military
concerns in a way the allocation of military benefits or rules con-
cerning tenure of officers do not. If a court is at all inclined to treat
military cases differently, a challenge to combat assignments is likely to be
singled out for special treatment.197
The combat exclusion issue is unique. The issue entails direct
concerns about national security and equal opportunity. 198
Although exclusionists would find the two concepts incompatible, 199
if the issue were brought before the Court, it would have to balance
these competing interests.200 However, a question remains as to
whether the Court would, or should, review this issue.
194 See supra part II.A.
195 See Gemmette, supra note 40, at 99.
196 Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68.
197 Goodman, supra note 26, at 267 (emphasis added).
198 See Gemmette, supra note 40, at 98.
199 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
200 See, e.g., Gemmette, supra note 40, at 98 ("[The Supreme Court will have to
balance the competing interests of combat-desiring women on the one hand with the
overriding military concerns for national safety .... ").
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III
THE PRINCIPLE OF DEFERENCE VERSUS THE POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINE
A. The Principle of Deference
The military occupies an important part in our nation's history.
In drafting the Constitution, the founding fathers sought to incor-
porate safeguards to prevent the type of abuse and oppression they
had previously experienced with the British Army.20 1 Article I, Sec-
tion 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to govern the
Armed Forces.20 2 The prevailing view at the time was that Congress
should have wide power in this area.203
Given this history, courts have considered it their constitutional
duty not to interfere with the military's operations.20 4 This self-
imposed judicial restraint resulted in the principle of deference, a
limited standard of judicial review aimed at providing a balance of
power between the government's branches.20 5 The principle of def-
erence is also known as the doctrine of military necessity, the sepa-
rate community doctrine, or the nonreviewability doctrine. 20 6
Because of the principle of deference, a successful constitutional
military-related challenge is difficult to mount if the military can
provide any type of reasoning for its actions.20 7 In a sense, the effect
is sometimes a form ofjudicial abdication under the guise ofjudicial
review.
201 See, e.g., Bilello, supra note 157, at 468-71 (discussing how the American Revolu-
tion and the public distrust of a standing army influence the Framer's decision to estab-
lish safeguards). See generally WALTER Mi.Lis, THE CONsTrruTroN AND THE COMMON
DEFENSE 5 (1959) ("The authors of the Constitution had all been brought on the axiom,
endlessly reiterated since the days of the Revolution and before, that 'standing armies
are ever a menace to the liberties of the people.' ") (citation omitted).
202 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. The relevant text is as follows: "To raise and support
Armies .... ""To provide and maintain a Navy ... ," and "To provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States."
203 See Bilello, supra note 157, at 470-71.
204 Id. at 476 ("[A] majority of the Court contends that an over-intrusive judicial role
in this context would constitute an unjustified encroachment upon an inherently legisla-
tive function.").
205 Id. at 465.
206 See Mary C. Griffin, Note, Making the Army Safe for Diversity: A Title VII Remedy for
Discrimination in the Military, 96 YALE L.J. 2082, 2095 n.78 (1987).
207 See Bilello, supra note 157, at 476.
The legal consequence of the military's unique mission is that govern-
mental action which might otherwise infringe upon a constitutionally pro-
tected interest if undertaken in a civilian context may be deemed
constitutional in the military context because "there is simply not the
same autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community."
Id. (citations omitted).
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Whether labeled the "separate community" doctrine, the doctrine
of "military necessity," or the principle of deference, the effect of
the Court's military jurisprudence for members of the armed
forces asserting constitutional violations is the same-the likeli-
hood of success on the merits, given the significantly limited form
of "review," is quite remote.208
The extent to which the Court will defer to Congress on mili-
tary matters varies with each case. The result, however, remains
constant: deference lessens the standard of review for military-
related constitutional claims.20 9 First Amendment military-related
claims illustrate the Court's excessive application of the principle of
deference. Justice Rehnquist conceded that the Court's "review of
military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far
more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regu-
lations designed for civilian society." 210 Two military-related First
Amendment cases demonstrate how deference affects the constitu-
tional claims of military soldiers.
In Brown v. Glines,211 the Air Force removed the respondent, a
Captain in the Air Force Reserves, from active duty because he vio-
lated an order prohibiting service members from distributing peti-
tions on bases without the base commander's prior approval.2 12
The respondent argued that the regulations unconstitutionally vio-
lated his First Amendment right to free speech.213 Both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the regulations were
facially invalid.2 14 On the First Amendment issue, the appellate
court held that the regulations were overbroad in that "they might
allow commanders to suppress 'virtually all controversial written
material.' "215
The Supreme Court reversed. It reasoned that the government
had a legitimate interest in seeking to maintain discipline, 216 and
that because the military is unlike civilian society, "[t]he rights of
military men must yield somewhat 'to meet certain overriding de-
mands of discipline and duty.' "217
208 Id. at 466.
209 See, e.g., Linda Sugin, Note, First Amendment Rights of Military Personnel: Denying
Rights to Those Who Defend Them, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 855, 865 (1987) (arguing that the
Court's deference in military cases amounts to "virtually no review at all.").
210 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986).
211 Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
212 Id. at 351.
213 Id.
214 Glines v. Wade, 401 F. Supp. 127, 132 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Glines v. Wade, 586
F.2d 675, 681 (9th Cir. 1978).
215 Glines, 444 U.S. at 353 (quoting Glines v. Wade, 586 F.2d 675, 681 (9th Cir.
1978)).
216 Id. at 354.
217 Id. (citations omitted).
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In contrast, Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, supplied
three reasons the regulations violated the First Amendment. First,
the regulations imposed a prior restraint on free speech.218 Second,
no procedures were implemented with the regulations to ensure
that the commander's decisionmaking process would not be arbi-
trary.219 Third, the regulations did not adequately satisfy the mili-
tary's interest in maintaining discipline. 220 After concluding that
the military regulations did infringe on the soldier's right to free
speech, Justice Brennan criticized the Court's deference to the mili-
tary. He argued that:
Military (or national) security is a weighty interest . .. [b]ut
the concept of military necessity is seductively broad, and has a
dangerousplasticity. Because they invariably have the visage of over-
riding importance, there is always a temptation to invoke security
"necessities" to justify an encroachment upon civil liberties....
The Court abdicates its responsibility to safeguard free expres-
sion when it reflexively bows before the shibboleth of military
necessity.2 2
1
A widely publicized military case involving First Amendment
rights is Goldman v. Weinberger.222 In Goldman, the petitioner claimed
the Air Force infringed on his right to exercise his religion freely by
prohibiting him from wearing a yarmulke. 223 An orthodox Jew and
a rabbi, Goldman worked as a psychologist at the base hospital. Ac-
cording to Air Force regulation 35-10, service personnel cannot
wear headgear inside any building while on duty.2 2 4 After Goldman
refused to comply with the order, the Air Force threatened to court-
martial him. The district court ruled that the regulation was uncon-
stitutional and enjoined the Air Force from enforcing the order.225
The court of appeals reversed. 226 The appellate court reasoned that
the appropriate standard of review for military regulations was not
strict scrutiny or even the rational relation test, but whether "legiti-
mate military ends are sought to be achieved .... "227 The court
held that the government regulations passed this standard because
the Armed Forces need uniformity in order to maintain
discipline. 228
218 Id. at 364.
219 Id. at 366.
220 Id. at 367.
221 Id. at 369-70 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
222 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
223 Id. at 504.
224 Id. at 505.
225 Id. at 506.
226 Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531, 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
227 Id. at 1535-36.
228 Id. at 1540.
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The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that because the Air
Force drew a line between prohibiting religious wear that was visible
and allowing religious wear that was not visible, the regulation was
"reasonabl[e] and evenhanded[]. "229 Four justices dissented. 230
Each of the dissenting justices was troubled by the majority's failure
to articulate a controlling standard of review. Justice O'Connor
wrote in dissent that "[t]he Court rejects Captain Goldman's claim
without even the slightest attempt to weigh his asserted right to the
free exercise of his religion against the interest of the Air Force ....
No test for free exercise claims in the military contest is even articu-
lated, much less applied." 231
B. Application of the Principle of Deference to the Combat
Exclusion Issue
If confronted with the combat exclusion issue, the current
Supreme Court would probably hold that combat exclusion was
constitutional. 232 If opponents of combat exclusion rules were to
present the issue to the Court, they could make the following argu-
ments. First, that the Court should apply the standard articulated in
Craig v. Boren, under which a gender-based classification is constitu-
tional if it is substantially related to an important governmental in-
terest.23 3 Second, while acknowledging that raising and supporting
armies are important governmental interests, 234 opponents could
argue that allowing women into combat would not "substantially
impede" these governmental interests. 235 The success of these ar-
guments, however, is based on two premises: (1) that the Court
would use the Craig v. Boren standard;236 and (2) that the Court
would find civilian gender discrimination cases persuasive. 23 7 Based
on the preceding analysis of military-related constitutional cases,
however, it is unlikely that the Court would do either. For example,
in Goldman the Court's analytical framework centers not on an ar-
229 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 510.
230 Justices Brennan, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Marshall wrote dissenting opinions.
231 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 528 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
232 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
234 See Buchanan, supra note 40, at 512-16.
235 Id. at 516.
236 Id. at 506-07 (applying the Craig v. Boren analysis to determine that the combat
exclusion rules are unconstitutional); see Gordon & Ludvigson, supra note 87, at 179-80
("If the Supreme Court were to review the constitutionality of the combat exclusion
laws, it would likely apply the intermediate level of scrutiny...."); Kornblum, supra note
26, at 433 (applying the Craig v. Boren analysis).
237 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 40, at 519-45 (relying on several civilian gender
discrimination cases to support her argument that the combat exclusion rules are
unconstitutional).
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ticulated standard of review238 but on the perceived differences be-
tween military and civilian life that necessitate a "far more
deferential [review of military constitutional claims] than constitu-
tional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian
society." 23 9
If the government were to argue for the constitutionality of the
combat exclusion rules, it could pose the following arguments.
First, the government has an important interest in maintaining na-
tional security through combat readiness and combat effective-
ness.240 Second, combat exclusion rules are substantially related to
maintaining national security.24 1 The government would probably
reiterate exclusionists' justifications for the rules to bolster this ar-
gument. 242 Third, it could argue that opponents of the combat ex-
clusion rules have no affirmative data to disprove the assumption
that women in combat would degrade combat effectiveness. 243 Fi-
nally, it could argue that because of military necessity, the Court
should defer to Congress on these matters. 244 The language con-
cerning deference would probably be convincing. If the main prin-
ciple behind deference is non-interference with congressional
oversight of military affairs, deference would be an important con-
sideration when examining national security.245
Faced with the preceding arguments, the Court would probably
declare the rules constitutional. Contrasted with other military
cases, one could argue that the government does have considerably
stronger arguments with the combat exclusion issue.246 In Brown
and Goldman, the government argued that restrictions on free
speech were necessary to maintain discipline but failed to explain
how the soldiers' actions undermined that discipline. 247 Justice
238 See, e.g., C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment is not Preferred: The Military
and Other "Special Contexts", 56 U. CINN. L. REV. 779, 801 (1988) ("Then-Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the Court, never formally articulated and applied a standard ofjudicial
review.").
239 See supra notes 210-31 and accompanying text.
240 See, e.g., Gemmette, supra note 40, at 98.
241 See id. at 98 ("[Nlational security demands that the armed services be efficient
and prepared to defend the nation if necessary.").
242 See supra part I.D.
243 See Tuten, supra note 43, at 261.
244 See generally James M. Hirschorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and
Servicemen's Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177 (1984) (arguing that judicial defer-
ence should be given to the military because of its unique role).
245 See supra note 188 and accompany text.
246 See discussion supra part II.B.
247 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506 (1986); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S.
348, 354 (1980). See Dienes, supra note 238, at 803. See also Goldman, 475 U.S. at 516.
Justice Brennan wrote in dissent that:
A deferential standard of review ... need not, and should not, mean that
the Court must credit arguments that defy common sense. When a mili-
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Blackmun, in his dissent in Goldman, argued that " '[r]ules are rules'
is not by itself a sufficient justification for infringing religious lib-
erty." 248 In contrast, even opponents of the combat exclusion rules
concede that the government does have credible arguments regard-
ing the combat exclusion issue.249 They uniformly agree that the
government's arguments would not be pretextual because national
security is an important governmental interest.250 It would be diffi-
cult to argue that "the Government has failed to make any meaning-
ful showing" regarding the combat exclusion issue.25 1
Commentators have argued that the Supreme Court has
adopted an anayltical framework by which it accepts review of mili-
tary constitutional issues, then proceeds to rubber-stamp the poli-
cies and laws implemented by Congress and the military under the
guise of separation of powers. This approach treats military issues
as being essentially nonjusticiable. 252 For example, Professor
Dienes stated that the Goldman case "presents a patent example of
extreme deference to the military bordering on non-jus-
ticiability."2 53 For this reason, if the Court does confront the com-
bat exclusion issue, it would be preferable to decline review under
the political question doctrine instead of accepting review and then
applying the principle of heightened deference.2 54 The reasons for
this preference will be explained in the following section.
C. An Historical Overview of the Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine is a judicially self-imposed limi-
tation on the powers ofjudicial review.2 55 The Supreme Court will
review a case only if the claim is justiciable. Political questions are
only one of several doctrines ofjusticiability. A claim is justiciable if
it is not subject to one of the following exceptions: advisory opin-
tary service burdens the free exercise rights of its members in the name
of necessity, it must provide, as an initial matter and at a minimum, a
credible explanation of how the contested practice is likely to interfere with
the proffered military interest.
248 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 525 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
249 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 40, at 514-16; Goodman, supra note 26, at 264.
250 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 40, at 515 ("[I]t would be unwise and unrealistic
from a constitutional perspective to characterize the exclusion of women from military
combat as a device designed to establish male supremacy to suppress women.").
251 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 524-25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
252 See Dienes, supra note 238, at 815.
253 Id. at 808.
254 See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 26, at 266. ("[T]he toughest problem facing an
equal protection challenge is not showing the combat exclusion fails the the test; rather,
it is the 'great deference" courts show the military and their reluctance to interfere in
military matters.').
255 See NOWAK, supra note 171, at 102.
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ions, mootness, collusive or friendly opinions, lack of ripeness, lack
of standing, or political questions. 256
The political question doctrine differs from other justiciability
doctrines in three ways. First, "[u]nlike the other justiciability doc-
trines, the political question doctrine is not derived from Article
III's limitation of judicial power to 'cases' and 'controversies.' "257
In contrast, the political question doctrine is grounded in the princi-
ple of judicial review, which was judicially created in Marbury v.
Madison.258 Second, other justiciability exceptions are procedural in
nature; whereas the political question doctrine addresses the sub-
stantive content of the case. 259 Third, the Court's decision as to
whether a category of cases constitutes a political question "is abso-
lute in its foreclosure of judicial scrutiny." 260 With other jus-
ticiability exceptions, however, if certain facts changed, the Court
can review the case without overturning precedent. 261
The political question doctrine is perplexing for several rea-
sons. First, many scholars cannot agree on several aspects of the
doctrine: its definition, its scope, its validity, or even its exis-
tence.2 62 The end result is an intricate maze of convoluted ideas
and arguments that perpetually clash. Second, the Court has ap-
plied the doctrine inconsistently. 263 No clear Court guidelines exist
256 Id. at 55-87; see also ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (1962) (defining the exceptions to jus-
ticiability as the "passive virtues" of the Court).
257 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDICTON 130 (1989). See U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1.
258 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("Questions, in their nature political, or which
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court.") (Marshall, CJ.).
259 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 257, at 124; NOWAK, supra note 171, at 102.
260 See Nowak, supra note 171, at 102.
261 Id.
262 See, e.g., Martin H. RedishJudicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1031, 1031 (1985) (pointing out that many commentators have "disagreed about
its wisdom and validity... [and] the doctrine's scope and rationale"). There are several
articles criticizing the political question doctrine. Some of these authors believe that the
political question doctrine does not exist. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question "
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976). Other commentators argue that the political question
doctrine is dangerous to the concept of judicial review. See Robert F. Nagel, Political
Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
643 (1989). But see J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 97, 175 (1988) (arguing that "the political question doctrine is an integral part
of [our constitutional] tradition.").
263 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 257, at 125 ("[T]he political question doctrine
is particularly confusing because the Court has defined it differendy over the course of
American history."); Redish, supra note 262, at 1031 ("At least part of the explanation
for this confusion is the unpredictable method in which the Supreme Court has chosen
to invoke the doctrine over the years."); see also Mulhern, supra note 262, at 101 (arguing
that the Supreme Court has not adequately articulated the parameters of the political
question doctrine).
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to determine if a case falls under the political question doctrine. 264
For example, some have argued that the Court's criteria regarding
the parameters of a political question serve no useful purpose.2 65
Third, the term "political question" is a "misnomer." 26 6 Commen-
tators argue that since most cases carry some elements of a political
nature, it is impossible to distinguish justiciable cases from nonjusti-
ciable ones.267 No bright line rules exist for the political question
doctrine.
The definition of a political question can be expanded or con-
tracted in accordion-like fashion to meet the exigencies of the
times. A juridical definition of the term is impossible, for at root
the logic that supports it is circular: political questions are mat-
ters not soluble by the judicial process; matters not soluble by the
judicial process are political questions. 268
D. The Theories of the Political Question Doctrine
The theories used to justify the political question doctrine
range from strict constructionism to that of unchecked discretion.
All these theories aspire to demonstrate how the concepts ofjudicial
decisionmaking and its principles interrelate. "The academic de-
bate has centered primarily over how 'principled' use of the doctrine
must be."269
1. Political Question Doctrine: Classical Theory
The classical theorist's goal in utilizing a restrictive political
question doctrine is to maintain a regard for neutral decisionmak-
ing.270 The crux of the classical theory is that the political question
doctrine, like judicial review, is "of constitutional interpretation" 27 1
rather than judicial discretion. The classicists believe that a "bright-
264 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 257, at 126.
265 Ido at 126-27.
266 See generally NowAx, supra note 171, at 102 (suggesting that the political question
doctrine should be called the "doctrine of nonjusticiability").
267 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 257, at 125; Henkin, supra note 262, at 598-99.
268 See PHILIPPA STRUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND "POLITICAL QUESTIONS": A STUDY
IN JUDICIAL EvAsION 1-2 (1974) (quoting John P. Roche, Judicial Self-Restraint, 49 AM.
POL. ScI. REv. 762, 768 (1955)).
269 See Redish, supra note 262, at 1031.
270 See HERBERT WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in PRINCI-
PLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3 (1961).
271 See Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 YALE LJ. 517, 538 (1966). Many have noted that the classical theory is a form of
judicial review, not a form of abstinence. For discussion, see Henkin, supra note 262, at
600-01. See also WECHSLER, supra note 270, at 12 (agreeing that a determination that an
issue is textually committed to another branch is "a finding that itself requires an inter-
pretation"); cf. Redish, supra note 262, at 1032 n. 11, 1042 nn.67-68 (disagreeing that the
classical theory is just another form of the "traditional principles of judicial review").
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line rule" will enable justices to make neutral decisions as to
whether the political question doctrine applies in a given case. 272 In
Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan noted that the doctrine reflects the
principle of separation of powers. 273
Herbert Wechsler, a leading classicist, writes that the political
question doctrine should only apply when the Constitution has com-
mitted the resolution of the issue in controversy to another branch of
government. 274 The benefits of this theory are that it would main-
tain judicial neutrality in decisionmaking and alleviate much of the
confusion regarding when the political question doctrine should be
invoked. 275
2. Political Question Doctrine: Prudential Theories
Three versions to the prudential theory of the political question
doctrine exist. 276 The premise that interconnects these versions is
that the political question doctrine is not rigid, as classicists claim,
but is a flexible doctrine that allows judicial discretion in
decisionmaking. 277
a. Opportunistic Theory
The opportunistic theory of the political question doctrine en-
tails two assumptions: that justices are not neutral decisionmakers,
and that they often take into account their political survival. 278 The
opportunistic theorists argue that the political question doctrine
consists of two factors: the impossibility of enforcement and the
272 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 262, at 1039 ("This substantially narrowed version of
the doctrine is thought to have the benefit of confining the Court's determinations to
truly principled exercises.").
273 Scharpf, supra note 271, at 538. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 257, at 130
("The political question doctrine might be treated as constitutional if it is thought to be
based on separation of powers or textual commitments to other branches of
government.").
274 See WECHSLER, supra note 270. Wechsler argued that "all the doctrine can defen-
sibly imply is that the courts are called upon to judge whether the Constitution has
committed to another agency of government the autonomous determination of the issue
raised ...." Id. at 11-12. Wechsler further argues that the judiciary has no power to
abstain from review. Id. at 9. For critical responses to Wechsler's theory, see Redish,
supra note 262, at 1039-41, 1044-45 ("His point.., appears to be that the accepted role
of the judiciary and of its authority ofjudicial review render the judiciary powerless to
establish such a doctrine."); Scharpf, supra note 271, at 539-40. See also BICKEL, supra
note 256, at 125-26 (writing about the classical theory, Bickel argued that "[t]he political
question doctrine simply resists being domesticated in this fashion. There is ... some-
thing different about it, in kind not in degrees something greatly more flexible, some-
thing of prudence, not construction and not principle."). Id. at 46.
275 See WECHSLER, supra note 270, at 11-15.
276 See Scharpf, supra note 271, at 548-66.
277 Id. at 548-49.
278 Id. at 549-55.
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lack of social consensus. 279 The impossibility of enforcement is the
most important factor in determining whether the Court will label
an issue political.28 0 Enforcement correlates to the power of the
Court. The Court has no means to enforce its decisions; it is the
Court's prestige that carries the weight of its decisions. 28 ' Were this
prestige lost, the Court's opinions would be merely political com-
mentaries. "[I]t is an axiom of constitutional justice that any deci-
sion which the Court thinks will not be enforced will probably not
be made. ' 28 2
In addition to enforcement problems, political questions also
involve a lack of social consensus. 28 3 Courts are wary of refusing to
review cases that the public feels strongly about. This, of course,
relates to the issue of executive enforceability. Though the court is
not politically responsible, the other branches of government are.28 4
If the Court decides an issue about which a strong social consensus
exists, the consensus will compel the other branches to enforce it.285
In contrast, when a lack of social consensus exists, the Court must
closely evaluate the problem of executive enforceability. This prob-
lem enhances the "judicial dilemma." 28 6
279 See STRUM, supra note 268, at 4-5. But see Scharpf, supra note 271, at 549 n.110
(describing Strum's theory as a "hot potato theory." Scharpf believes that the opportu-
nistic theory is unpersuasive because there are many other judicial methods available
that judges could use to maneuver around "unpopular" decisions.).
280 See Strum, supra note 268, at 4-6.
281 See Redish, supra note 262, at 1053 ("[The] rationale is the fear that the judid-
ary's authority and legitimacy will be significantly undermined if the political branches
ignore the judicial decision ...."). But cf CHEMERINSKY, supra note 257, at 129
("[C]ritics contend that the federal courts' credibility is quite robust, that there is no
evidence that particular rulings have any effect on thejudiciary's legitimacy .....
282 See STRUM, supra note 268, at 4.
283 Id at 4-6 ("[J]udicial dilemma cannot exist where there is a strong societal con-
sensus .. "). Cf Scharpf, supra note 271, at 553 ("I submit that a Court... will not seek
shelter under the political question doctrine merely because it fears that its determina-
tion of an issue might be unpopular, or even extremely unpopular."). Note that this
criticism might actually reinforce the opportunistic theory. Strum argues that it is only
where there is a lack of social consensus, coupled with enforcement problems, that the
Court will utilize the political question doctrine.
284 See generally JEssE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 48 (1980) ("[I]n comparison to the political branches, the Court ... must be
found to be the loser in terms of political responsibility.").
285 See STRUM, supra note 268, at 6.
286 One must remember that these factors are present in cases in which a true judi-
cial dilemma exists. It should not be inferred that the Court is preoccupied with their
own prestige. The Court has ruled on several controversial issues that were unpopular
with either the public or the other branches of government. See Scharpf, supra note 271,
at 552-53.
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b. Cognitive Theory
The cognitive theory of the political question doctrine posits
that it is appropriate for the court to abstain from review when "a
lack of legal principles to apply [exists]." 287 Justice Frankfurter il-
lustrates the "absence of standard rationale" 288 in his dissent in
Baker v. Cart.28 9 In reasoning that apportionment cases are political
questions, he wrote: "A controlling factor in [political question]
cases is that ... there exists no standard ascertainable by settled
judicial experience or process by reference to which a political deci-
sion affecting the question at issue between the parties can be
judged." 290 In Baker, even though Justice Brennan disagreed that
all apportionment cases are nonjusticiable, he did include the cogni-
tive theory into his definition of the political question doctrine. 29'
c. Normative Theory
The normative theory of the political question doctrine argues
that the main goal in judicial review is for justices to make decisions
that comport with principle. 292 As Professor Bickel, the main pro-
ponent of this theory, stated: "The role of the Court ... [is] to
preserve, protect and defend principle." 293 This theory is premised
on ascertaining "what the Court ought to do." 294 According to
Bickel, a discretionary political question doctrine enables the Court
to protect its legitimacy while concentrating on making "correct"
decisions. 295 Commentators point to two main components of this
theory: that certain federal actions should not be governed by legal
287 Id. at 555 (quoting Oliver P. Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal
Courts, 8 MINN. L. REv. 485, 512 (1924)).
288 See Redish, supra note 262, at 1046.
289 369 US. 186 (1962).
290 Id. at 322-23.
291 Id. at 217.
292 See Redish, supra note 262, at 1049. Redish noted that the normativist is con-
cerned with principled decisionmaking. He then argues that using this concern to justify
the political question doctrine presents a "narrow, short-sighted and even solipsistic
view of thejudiciary's function in a constitutional system." Id. Normativists emphasize,
however, that judges must be allowed discretion in order to formulate opinions that will
"be the outgrowth of logic and reason .. " Id. at 1032.
293 See BICKEL, supra note 256, at 188.
294 See Scharpf, supra note 271, at 562.
295 Compare Nagel, supra note 262, at 653 ("[Bickel] admired what he feared, and it is
clear that he intended the exercise of political discretion on avoidance issues to protect
the prestige and integrity of the judiciary and its vital role in the enunciation of princi-
ple.") with Herbert Wechsler, Book Review, 75 YALE L.J. 672, 674 (1966) (reviewing AL-
EXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) and POLITICS AND THE
WARREN COURT (1965)) (arguing that Bickel's endorsement of "discretionary avoidance
devices [would] divorce the Court entirely from the text that it interprets.").
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principles, 296 and that "certain issues simply do not lend themselves
to principled judicial resolution." 297
Bickel and other normativists are concerned that the Court will
legitimize, on the merits, actions by the legislative and executive
branches that go against principle.298 "If the political institutions at
last insist upon a course of action that can not be accommodated to
principle, it is no part of the function of the Court to bless it how-
ever double-negatively. '299
3. Political Question Doctrine: Functional Theory
The functional theory posits that, in instances when the judicial
system limits the Court, it is appropriate for the Court to decline
review.300 Professor Scharpf listed three situations in which the
political question doctrine is appropriate: when it would be difficult
for the Court to obtain adequate information;30 ' when the Court
would be called upon to question, and possibly dispute, the govern-
ment's position on issues abroad;3 02 or when the Court's resolution
of the issue would hamper a specific political department entrusted
with that responsibility.30 3 Thus, this theory frames the political
question doctrine as a way to remedy the inadequacies of the judi-
cial system.30 4 Adjudication in cases where inadequacies exist
"would overreach the limits of [the Court's] responsibility. ' 30 5
E. Theoretical Analysis of Political Question Cases
As stated earlier, due to the Court's inconsistent application,
few specific categories of decisions fall wholly under the political
question doctrine. The following section, however, illustrates some
areas that the Court considered, at one time, to be political. This
296 The normativist believes that "the Court must survive in an often hostile political
world, and the best way to accomplish that feat and simultaneously maintain its legiti-
macy is to pick its fights." Redish, supra note 262, at 1032. Note how the normativist's
views overlap, to a certain degree, with the philosophies incorporated into the opportu-
nistic theory. See supra notes 278-86 and accompanying text.
297 See Redish, supra note 262, at 1032.
298 See Nagel, supra note 262, at 652-53.
299 See BICKEL, supra note 256, at 188.
300 See Scharpf, supra note 271, at 566-97. But cf Redish, supra note 262, at 1043
(arguing that Scharpf's functional theory is really a part of the prudential theory "in a
broad conceptual sense.").
301 See Scharpf, supra note 271, at 567-73.
302 Id- at 573-83.
303 Id at 583-87.
304 Id. at 566 ("[M]uch, if not all, of the Court's political question practice should,
like the procedural and jurisdictional techniques of avoidance, be explained in func-
tional terms, as the Court's acknowledgment of the limitations of the American judicial
process.").
305 Ia at 567.
1993]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
section will analyze each case using one or more of the preceding
political question theories.
1. Guaranty Clause
The Guaranty Clause of the Constitution assures that: "[t]he
United States shall guarantee to every State in [the] Union a Repub-
lican Form of Government." 30 6 The Court has applied the political
question doctrine in cases arising under this clause. 30 7 The most
famous Guaranty Clause case is Luther v. Borden,308 in which the
plaintiff sued the defendant for trespass. 30 9 In Luther, the defendant
broke into the plaintiff's house and arrested the plaintiff for or-
ganizing an uprising against the government of Rhode Island. At
the time, Rhode Island had two governments: the Freedmen's Con-
stitution and the People's Constitution.3 10 The People's Constitu-
tion was formed when citizens of Rhode Island revolted against the
Freedmen's Constitution and formed their own government. The
issue in the case was whether the defendant, a citizen under the
Freedman's Constitution, had the authority to act.31 1 His authority
depended on which government was the legitimate government of
Rhode Island. The Court ruled that the issue was political and de-
clined to review the case.3 12
Luther v. Borden can be applied to the classical theory of the
political question doctrine. In Luther, the Court reasoned that
"[u]nder [the Guaranty Clause] of the Constitution it rests with
Congress to decide what government is the established one in a
State."3 13 According to the classical theory, the determination of
which government was the legitimate government of Rhode Island
was textually committed to Congress. Therefore, the Court ab-
stained from judicial review.314
Both factors of the opportunistic theory of the political ques-
tion doctrine were present in Luther. First, no social consensus exis-
ted at the time of this highly publicized case. The nation was
divided over which government was the legitimate government of
Rhode Island.315 In addition, two other states, Michigan and Mary-
land, had formed their governments in the same way as the "new"
306 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
307 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 257, at 131; STRUM, supra note 268, at 11.
308 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
309 Id. at 34.
310 See STRUM, supra note 268, at 14.
311 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 35.
312 Id. at 46-47.
313 Id. at 42.
314 See STRUM, supra note 268, at 12.
315 Id. at 14-15.
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Rhode Island government.3 1 6 The outcome of this case would also
affect their present governments. The Court was concerned that the
"wrong" decision could lead to enforcement problems, perhaps
through a revolt.31 7 To favor one government over the other would
have been highly political, and the Court wanted to maintain
neutrality.318
2. Reapportionment
In order to have proper representation in Congress, the Consti-
tution requires states to reapportion themselves after every national
census.3 19 States accomplish this through redistricting. The Court
has been very inconsistent in reapportionment cases. In Colgrove v.
Green,320 Illinois plaintiffs sued to have congressional elections
delayed until after the state completed the process of redistricting.
The plaintiffs claimed that the state was malapportioned because the
district's boundaries were based on an outdated census. As a result,
the plaintiffs claimed that they were not adequately represented in
the House of Representatives. 321 The legislators had repeatedly
voted against resolutions to reapportion the state, largely because
many of them would be redistricting themselves out of office.3 22
The Court ruled that the issue was nonjusticiable.3 23 Justice Frank-
furter, writing for the majority, reasoned that "the appellants
ask[ed] of th[e] Court what [was] beyond its competence to
grant." 324
Frankfurter's reasoning illustrates the cognitive theory of the
political question doctrine. This theory supports the acquiescence
of the judiciary on issues that the Court cannot determine.325 In
contrast, Bickel argued that the result in Colgrove represents the nor-
mative theory. He believed that, when reviewing the case, the Court
considered a number of factors and concluded that the case could
not be resolved through legal principles.326
316 Id. at 22.
317 Id. at 21-22.
318 Id at 22 ("Many writers have pointed out that the Supreme Court's most impor-
tant asset is its high prestige. It would take gamblers less prudent than Supreme Court
justices to risk the loss of this prestige in a highly-charged partisan atmosphere.").
319 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2.
320 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
321 Id at 552.
322 See STRUM, supra note 268, at 41-42.
323 Colgrove, 328 U.S. at 552.
324 Id.
325 See, e.g., Scharpf, supra note 271, at 555 (quoting Oliver P. Field, The Doctrine of
Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REV. 485, 512 (1924) ("Where no rules
exist the court is powerless to act.")).
326 See BICKEL, supra note 256, at 190-92. Bickel wrote that:
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Sixteen years later, in Baker v. Carr, the Court decided that reap-
portionment cases did not always involve political questions and, at
times, could be justiciable.3 27 The plaintiffs, residents of Tennes-
see, claimed that the Tennessee General Assembly had violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by holding
elections with malapportioned districts.3 28 The last reapportion-
ment in Tennessee was based on the 1901 census, almost sixty years
before the plaintiffs filed their claim. Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, held that this issue was not political.329 The Court re-
jected the argument that the "lack of satisfactory criteria for a judi-
cial determination," 330 which may make an issue political, applied to
this case. Brennan reasoned that the equal protection issue pos-
sessed judicially manageable standards that were "well developed
and familiar." 331
The opportunistic theory, however, could also explain the deci-
sion in Baker. One could argue that the Court changed its mind on
the reapportionment issue because there was no longer a lack of
social consensus nor an enforcement problem.332 First, since Col-
grove, the demographics of the country were changing. States were
becoming more urban and social consensus was growing on the de-
sirability of equal representation.3 33 Second, President Kennedy
was a supporter of increased representation in urban areas and for
Colgrove is a political-question case, and the only remaining inquiry is
whether it holds that apportionment.., is a matter of the sort for which
we have no rules... or that it is of the sort to which rules are applicable,
although they "should be only among the numerous relevant considera-
tions." There is nothing in the opinion or in our political and legal tradi-
tions to support the first proposition; there is everything to affirm the
second.
Id. at 191-92.
327 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
328 Id. at 194.
329 Id. at 209. Justice Brennan, in Baker v. Carr, defined political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of decid-
ing without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudi-
cial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adher-
ence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embar-
rassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
Id. at 217.
330 Id. at 210.
331 Id. at 226.
332 See STRUM, supra note 268, at 65-66.
333 Id. at 66.
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minorities, thus making the enforcement problem unlikely.33 4 "The
Court's realization that a societal majority and its Presidential repre-
sentative would be sufficient insurance against enforcement difficul-
ties caused the reapportionment issue to be dusted off and removed
from the political question shelf."335
3. Military
Gilligan v. Morgan336 is the only military case in which the
Supreme Court refused review under the political question doc-
trine. The plaintiffs in Gilligan were full-time students at Kent State
University who sought relief after the Governor of Ohio ordered the
National Guard to quell a disturbance that arose during political
protests.3 37 Several students were injured and some were killed
when the Guard fired upon protesting students. The plaintiffs
sought three types of relief: an injunction against the governor to
stop premature ordering of troops; an injunction against the Na-
tional Guard for future violations of student rights; and a declara-
tion that section 2933.55 of the Ohio code was unconstitutional.3 38
The district court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiffs failed
to state a claim.3 39 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
decision with the exception of the issue concerning the National
Guard. The court remanded for consideration of the following
issue:
Whether there is a pattern of training, weaponry and orders in the
Ohio National Guard which singly or together require or make
inevitable the use of fatal force in suppressing civilian disorders
when the total circumstances at the critical time are such that non-
lethal force would suffice to restore order and the use of lethal
force is not reasonably necessary?3 40
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision.3 4 1
The Court held that the respondents sought judicial evaluation of
the composition of the Guard in terms of "training, weaponry, and
orders. '3 42 In response to their request, ChiefJustice Burger, writ-
ing for the majority, stated:
[T]he nature of the questions to be resolved on remand are sub-
jects committed expressly to the political branches of government
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
337 Id. at 2-3.
338 Id. at 3.
339 Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
340 Id. at 608.
341 Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 4.
342 Id. at 5.
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* ... The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force
are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to
civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.3 43
Several of the political question doctrine theories could be used
to explain the Court's decision in Gilligan. First, Gilligan's analysis
reflects the classical theory of the political question doctrine.3 44
The critical issue in Gilligan was whether the training of the National
Guard was adequate. The Court ruled that Congress possesses the
power to make those determinations. 345 They stressed that the na-
ture of the issue was textually committed to Congress. This illus-
trates Wechsler's view that "the only proper judgment that may lead
to an abstention from decision is that the Constitution has commit-
ted the determination of the issue to another agency of government
than the courts." 46
Second, under the opportunistic theory, Gilligan involved a sub-
stantial enforcement problem. The plaintiffs wanted the Court to
supervise the National Guard. Neither the National Guard nor the
state of Ohio wanted the courts to run its vital military force.3 47 The
Court realized that continual judicial surveillance of the National
Guard would lead to tension and inevitable conflict between the
branches of government, which could result in a loss of prestige to
the Court. The politically expedient answer was to decline review.
Third, under the cognitive theory, the Court was concerned
about whether adequate standards exist for determining the suffi-
ciency of National Guard training.3 48 As Chief Justice Burger
stated, "[i]t would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the
type of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution
to be left to the political branches ... [or] an area of governmental
activity in which the courts have less competence"3 49
343 Id. at 10.
344 See R. Brooke Jackson, The Political Question Doctrine: Where Does it Stand After Pow-
ell v. McCormack, O'Brien v. Brown and Gilligan v. Morgan?, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 477,
485-86 (1973) ("The primary basis for this decision was that the supervision of the Na-
tional Guard is textually committed by the Constitution to Congress."); cf. Henkin, supra
note 262, at 619-20 (arguing that the ruling in Gilligan was based more on denying relief
than the utilization of the political question doctrine). But cf. Redish, supra note 262, at
1035, 1056 ("Even if, as Henkin argues, Gilligan could have been resolved in the same
manner by narrower means, it must be noted that the Court itself clearly did not view its
rationale as so narrowly confined."). Id. at 1035.
345 Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10.
346 WECHSLER, supra note 270, at 13.
347 See Jackson, supra note 344, at 486-87.
348 See id. at 488; cf. Redish, supra note 262, at 1056-57 (arguing that the ruling in
Gilligan represented more of a prudential analysis).
349 Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added).
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Fourth, under the functional theory, the Court was concerned
that to provide the relief sought would be usurping the authority of
another branch of government.350 The relief sought was continual
judicial supervision of Ohio's National Guard, a role which the
Court considered to be "[e]xcessive interference with [a] coordi-
nate[d] branch[] of government."'35 1
E. Application of the Political Question Doctrine to the
Combat Exclusion Rules
Although each of the political question doctrine theories have
varied in significance over the years, they offer a composite view of
the doctrine. By applying each of these theories to the combat ex-
clusion issue, it can be seen that the combat exclusion issue could
constitute a political question.
1. Application of the Classical Theory to the Combat Exclusion Issue
The combat exclusion issue could constitute a political question
under the classical theory. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
gives Congress the authority to regulate the Armed Forces.3 52
Under the combat exclusion issue, the question is whether women
in combat would degrade combat effectiveness.353 At the time of
the framing of the Constitution, many thought that the national gov-
ernment should "have unlimited powers to defend the free sover-
eign state."3 54 To ensure that Congress would not abuse its power,
the founding fathers incorporated a series of checks and balances on
both Congress and the President regarding the use of military
power.3 55 From the legislative history, it is apparent that the fram-
ers of the Constitution desired to leave military training issues re-
garding national security exclusively to Congress. Thus, under the
classical theory, the Court should decline review of a claim requiring
the resolution of the combat exclusion issue. The danger, as some
have argued, is that if the Constitution gave Congress the exclusive
authority to regulate all military affairs, the Court would have to de-
cline review of any constitutional issue involving the military.3 56
350 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 257, at 143-44.
351 Id. at 143.
352 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 13.
353 See supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
354 See, e.g., MiLms, supra note 201, at 7 (quoting Hamilton, who wrote that military
powers "ought to exist without limitation because it is impossible toforsee or define the extent
and variety of national exigencies.").
355 Id. at 8.
356 See Redish, supra note 262, at 1041 (arguing that even a restricted view of the
political question doctrine is dangerous. "The important point... is that under tradi-
tional judicial review theory, the absence of a limitation on the exercise of legislative or
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Such an argument is unwarranted, however, because the jus-
ticiability of a case depends upon the context in which it arises.35 7
The vast majority of military cases that raise constitutional issues
concern administrative matters. The combat exclusion rule is the
exception to the typical military case.358 Utilization of the political
question doctrine in this context is the rare exception, not the gen-
eral rule. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of military consti-
tutional cases would still be justiciable.359
2. Application of the Cognitive Theory of the Political Question
Doctrine
Under the cognitive theory, the Court must decide if it is able to
resolve the combat exclusion issue by relying on its own level of
judicial expertise.360 While it is true that the Court often decides
highly complex or specialized issues,3 61 the combat issue presents a
special challenge.362
[W]e must examine the physical requirements for combat roles
and design honest performance standards ... to evaluate whether
women can meet the demands of a variety of combat roles....
[M]any other questions must be answered thoroughly so the
United States can be certain that changes in the current policy
would not occur at the expense of defense preparedness or the
safety of military personnel. It will take time to satisfy these im-
peratives and it will involve the judgments of a great many
people.3 63
Congress and the military must address several topics when de-
ciding whether integrating women into combat units would affect
national security.3 64 If the Court were to examine the constitution-
executive authority... should not preclude judicial application of the standards embod-
ied in relevant constitutional amendments.").
357 See Scharpf, supra note 271, at 562.
358 See discussion supra part II.B.
359 See, e.g., Scharpf, supra note 271, at 583 ("[The political question doctrine has
found only very limited application in the war and [national] security cases.").
360 Id at 560 ("In a political question decision, the Court does not hold that legal
rules do not apply; it holds that competence to apply them should rest with the political
departments.").
361 See Gemmette, supra note 40, at 98-101.
362 See Goodman, supra note 26, at 264; Kornblum, supra note 26, at 430-31.
363 See Women in Combat Hearings, supra note 5 (ChristopherJehn, Assistant Secretary
of Defense).
364 For example, Congress requested that the Presidential Commission study nu-
merous issues regarding women in combat:
The Commission shall conduct a thorough study of all matters relating to
the assignments of women in the Armed Forces and make findings on...
the following matters . . .combat readiness . . .physical readiness ...
pregnancy and .. .childcare needs . . .unit morale and cohesion ...
advisability of permitting only voluntary assignments of women to com-
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ality of the combat exclusion rules, it would have to determine
whether the combat exclusion rules further the government's inter-
est in national security.365 The Court's task would center on deter-
mining whether female combatants would "substantially impede"
combat effectiveness.3 66 This task is arguably not judicially manage-
able, as both Congress and the Armed Forces have not yet deter-
mined the effects that women in combat would have on national
security.367 However, Congress' and the military's inability to ad-
dress this issue adequately may be a compelling argument for the
Court's intervention. The probative cost ofjudicial error, however,
makes this solution unlikely. Without women actually serving in
combat, it is difficult to ascertain their effectiveness.368
The Court has neither addressed the constitutionality of the
combat exclusion rules nor assessed its level of expertise in analyz-
ing this issue. The Roster opinion illustrates the Court's discomfort
in discussing the combat exclusion issue.369 Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the majority, stated that the Rostker issue only concerned re-
gistration and that the constitutionality of the combat exclusion
rules would remain unreviewed. He stressed that this "should dis-
pel any concern that we are injecting ourselves in an inappropriate manner
into military affairs.' '3 70
3. Application of the Functional Theory of the Political Question
Doctrine
The functional theory recognizes the special characteristics of
military actions that affect national security.371 As Professor Scharpf
points out: "[c]ases which deal[] with military measures in war or,
more generally, with measures taken in the interest of national se-
curity would seem to have presented functional difficulties ....
bat positions... advisability of requiring women to register for conscrip-
tion... legal and policy implications.., costs of meeting [modifications]
... [and] effects of existing laws.
For greater detail on the Commission's topics for study, see 138 CONG. REC. S12416
(daily ed. Aug. 15, 1991).
365 See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
366 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
367 See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
368 See Hirschorn, supra note 244, at 240 ("The primary function of a military organi-
zation is to wage war, and the only true measurement of its effectiveness is how well it
performs in war. Anything else is an approximation: training and exercises cannot ap-
proach the actual danger, dislocation, fear, and uncertainty of war itself.").
369 See supra notes 168-93 and accompanying text.
370 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 63 (1981) (emphasis added).
371 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 262, at 1051 (conceding that certain rare issues con-
cerning foreign policy and national security may justify the political question doctrine).
372 See Scharpf, supra note 271, at 583.
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a. Lack of Information
Under the functional theory, one of the justifications for using
the political question doctrine is when an information problem
exists.3 73 An information problem occurs when "the Court is not
assured of full clarification of all relevant questions of fact and
law."3 74 The combat exclusion issue suffers from such a dearth of
information. As previously stated, there are many unresolved ques-
tions regarding women in combat.375 Without an actual combat sit-
uation, it would be impossible to determine the effectiveness of
female combatants. Such issues are "delicate, complex, and involve
large elements of prophecy." 376
b. Intrusion on Another Branch of Government
The Court could create a remedy for the combat exclusion issue
if it declared the rule unconstitutional. The concern is not that a
remedy is impossible, but rather with the difficulty of creating an
effective remedy without impeding the effectiveness of another
branch. There are three possible outcomes if the Court were to re-
view the combat exclusion issue.
i. Remedy One
If the Court declared the rules constitutional, no remedy would
be required.
ii. Remedy Two
If the Court declared the rules unconstitutional, it would have
to fashion a remedy that would protect an individual's rights without
diminishing military effectiveness. The Court, in essence, must bal-
ance the interests to determine an appropriate remedy. Due to the
speculative nature of female combatants' effects on national secur-
ity, balancing interests would be difficult. The cost ofjudicial error
is high. Furthermore, the Court might be deterred because of its
reluctance to intrude on another branch. If the remedy is similar to
373 Id. at 567 ("When an absolute solution is not acceptable, an information prob-
lem which is inherent in an issue may justify the application of the political question
doctrine.").
374 Id.
375 See, e.g., Tuten, supra note 43, at 261-62.
376 See Scharpf, supra note 271, at 578 (quoting Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)). See generally Hirschorn, supra note 244,
at 240 ("Ifjudicial intervention does impair the effectiveness of [the] military ... there is
no way to determine and correct the mistake until it has produced the substantial and
sometimes irreparable cost of failure.").
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that in Gilligan, then the Court may regard any remedy as intruding
upon another branch.377
iii. Remedy Three
The Court could also declare the laws unconstitutional but re-
fuse to grant a remedy for "want of equity."378 Professor Henkin
argued that denying a remedy on equitable grounds comports more
with the concept of judicial review and constitutional interpreta-
tion.3 7 9 Commentators have criticized this argument.3s0 "Charac-
terizing [a] Court's rationale as a matter of equity, rather than of the
political question doctrine, does not render the decision any more
defensible as a constitutional matter, and can only have the counter-
productive effect of obscuring the real issues."'38 '
4. Application Under the Opportunistic Theory
a. Social Consensus
Under the opportunistic theory, the two factors present in most
political question cases are also present in the combat exclusion is-
sue. Over the years, the social consensus concerning women in
combat has changed dramatically.38 2 During the Persian Gulf War,
377 See supra notes 342-43 and accompanying text.
378 See Henkin, supra note 262, at 617. Henkin argued:
The equity practice of the federal courts has largely retained its historic
scope, its historic exceptions, and its tradition of broad discretion and
flexibility, leaving large room for "wisdom" and "prudence." There is
no reason why these should not include considerations of federalism or
the separation of powers, of institutional integrity and the inter-institu-
tional harmony implied in the nature ofjudicial power and the character
of judicial institutions in their relation to political power and political
institutions.
Id. at 618-19 (footnotes omitted).
379 Id. at 622 (arguing that "[t]o deny a remedy on equitable grounds does not carve
an exception in Marbury v. Madison for which there is no basis in constitutional text or in
anything else relevant to constitutional interpretation."). But see Mulhern, supra note
262, at 99 ("Commentators attack the doctrine as inconsistent with basic principles of
our constitutional practice, but these attacks are unsuccessful. Their failure reveals flaws
in the critics' assumptions about the role of the judiciary in our constitutional system.").
380 There are two main criticisms of Henkin's theory. First, the concept of judicial
review has no textual basis in the Constitution. Second, ChiefJustice Marshall acknowl-
edged the political question doctrine in Marbury v. Madison. Therefore, political ques-
tions were "carved out" as an exception to judicial review. For further criticism, see
Nagel, supra note 262, at 654-55; Redish, supra note 262, at 1055-57.
381 See Redish, supra note 262, at 1056.
382 See, e.g., BINwIN & BACH, supra note 13, at 39 (reporting on two polls taken in the
1970's. In the first study, 24%6 of those polled agreed that women should have equal
treatment regarding the draft, while 717o disagreed. In the second study, 65% reacted
unfavorably when asked to note their attitude toward women's military service, while
17% reacted favorably.
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polls indicated that America is divided over the issue.383 In fact,
even women in the military are divided over their role in combat.38 4
One reason for the lack of social consensus is that the issue involves
heated conflicts over concerns of inequality versus national
security.3 85
b. Enforcement
If the Court declares the combat exclusion rules and policies
unconstitutional, enforcement problems are likely to emerge.
Neither Congress, the President, nor the Armed Forces seem pre-
pared to lift the combat exclusion rules completely.3 86 For example,
even Representative Beverly Brown, who supports increasing op-
portunities for women in the military, rejects a "[w]holesale lifting
of the combat exclusion rules."3 87
5. Application of the Normative Theory of the Political Question
Doctrine
Again, the normative theory consists of two components: that
certain governmental actions should be immune from judicial re-
view and that certain issues cannot be resolved by legal principles.
Under the first premise, normativists argue that in some cases "the
job is better done without rules, or that even though there are appli-
cable rules, these rules should be among the numerous relevant
considerations." 388 One could argue that the combat exclusion is-
sue presents a need for such a balancing test because it involves
considerations of equal protection and national security.
Under the second premise, Professor Bickel argues that some
decisions cannot be resolved when they involve the following fac-
tors: "lack of capacity; ... strangeness of the issue; ... sheer mo-
mentousness of [the issue]; ... anxiety.., that the judicial judgment
will be ignored, [or] ... should be;... [and] inner vulnerability, the
self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible."3 8 9
From the previous theoretical applications, one can make a strong
383 See, e.g., Kantrowitz, supra note 59, at 23 (public split on women in ground com-
bat: 52% for to 44% against); USA TODAY, Sept. 20, 1991, at IA (public split on women
in combat issue 53% for and 45% against).
384 See Kantrowitz, supra note 59, at 23 ("There's also some doubt among military
women themselves about ground fighting.").
385 See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
386 See discussion supra part I.E.
387 See Hamit, supra note 56, at 31.
388 See Scharpf, supra note 271, at 559 (quoting Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to SecureJudi-
czal Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1303 (1961)).
389 See BICKEL, supra note 256, at 184.
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argument that the combat exclusion issue is not judicially
resolveable.390
F. The Political Question Doctrine is the Better Opinion for
the Combat Exclusion Rules
The Court should use the political question doctrine if con-
fronted with the constitutionality of the combat exclusion rules for
two reasons. First, a high cost of judicial error exists in relation to
this issue. As previously stated, the actual effect of women in com-
bat will not be known until after integration.39 1 "Full combat status
should not be granted . . .until we have had the opportunity to
experiment using various mixes of women in selected combat units
under actual combat conditions."3 9 2 Congress or the President is
the best political institution to oversee this experiment. Besides be-
ing politically responsible, they can correct judgmental errors more
expeditiously.3 93 For example, if a war breaks out and women are
integrated into combat units and, for whatever reason, the integra-
tion is not effective, Congress or the President could act more
quickly to remedy the situation. This is not the case with the Court.
"If judicial intervention does impair the effectiveness of [the] mili-
tary ... there is no way to determine and correct the mistake until it
has produced the substantial and sometimes irreparable cost of fail-
ure. '3 94 Even individuals supporting the abolition of combat exclu-
sion rules acknowledge that modification of the rules would be more
appropriate: "[A]n immediate and full-scale integration in spite of
the uncertainty would be inappropriate and irresponsible."3 95
Second, by applying the political question doctrine to the exclu-
sion rules, the Court would reverse a growing trend towards unbri-
dled deference. "In the military context, the deference is often so
extensive as to raise the question whether judicial review is even ap-
plicable."3 96 As previously explained, recent cases illustrate the
Court's willingness to accept virtually any justification for which the
"military perceives a need."3 97 Some have argued that such defer-
ence is "de facto nonjusticiability." 398 However, the judicial conse-
quences of the two doctrines differ significantly.399 Under "de facto
390 See discusssion supra part III.D.
391 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
392 See Tuten, supra note 43, at 261.
393 See Hirschorn, supra note 244, at 240.
394 Id
395 SeeJody M. Gramsie, Note, Gender Discrimination in the Military: The Unconstitutional
Exclusion of Women From Combat, 17 VAL. U. L. REv. 547, 586 (1983).
396 See Dienes, supra note 238, at 799.
397 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 528 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
398 See Dienes, supra note 238, at 820.
399 Redish offers an interesting distinction between deference and political question:
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nonjusticiability," the Court makes a decision on the merits. Under
the political question doctrine, however, the Court does not make a
decision on the merits. Though one could argue that the net effect
may be the same, two important distinctions exist. First, under the
political question rubric, the Court does not explicitly approve the
acts or regulations of the military or Congress. 400 Second, the
Court will not apply the political question doctrine in every military
case.40 1 Justice Brennan noted in Baker v. Carr that political ques-
tions do not apply to whole categories. 402 Instead of applying maxi-
mum deference in every military case, the Court could use
nonjusticiability sparingly and apply a limited amount of deference
in other military-related constitutional cases.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the combat exclusion rules fit into the framework
of a political question. The Court, in accepting the issue, can do
three things: decide the issue as it would any other constitutional
issue; decide the issue in the light of extreme deference to the mili-
tary; or decline to review the issue because it involves a political
question. If the Court feels uncomfortable deciding this issue on
the merits, it would be better to decline review. Our political system
has safeguards to ensure the resolution of this issue in another
arena.
Many commentators have criticized the political question doc-
trine. Although the criticisms vary, they comprise of two major ar-
guments. First, commentators consider the political question
doctrine dangerous to the concept of judicial review because of its
[I]t is vital to distinguish between appropriate "substantive" deference-
in which the judiciary, while retaining power to render final decisions on
the meaning of the constitutional limits, nevertheless takes into account
the need for expertise or quick action-and unacceptable total "proce-
dural" deference, where the court concludes simply that resort to the ju-
diciary constitutes the wrong "procedure," because the decision is
exclusively that of the political branches.
Redish, supra note 262, at 1048-49.
Redish's argument, however, fails to consider when "appropriate deference," as he
calls it, is replaced by the absolute deference, such as that used in military cases.
Although Redish concedes that the difference "may be only one of degree," id. at 1049
n.96, when looking at his argument from a narrow perspective, the "substantive" and
"procedural" deference are indistinguishable. See Mulhern, supra note 262, at 133 n.142
("Commentators who would make the political question doctrine appear aberrant must
explain the prominence ofjudicial deference in our legal culture as evidence of some-
thing other than division of responsibility for constitutional interpretation.").
400 See BICKEL, supra note 256, at 188.
401 See supra notes 356-59 and accompanying text.
402 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).
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potential for abuse.40 3 Second, commentators argue that the princi-
ple of deference obviates the need for the doctrine.40 4 In the vast
majority of civilian cases, "ordinary" deference is preferable to com-
plete abstinence from judicial review. The Court, however, does
not apply "ordinary" deference to military cases. When deference
is given to the point of "de facto nonjusticiability," the principle
becomes more dangerous than the political question doctrine itself.
If the concern among commentators is the compromise of the con-
cept of judicial review, then the principle of absolute deference
needs to be reevaluated. 40 5 Currently, the political question doc-
trine offers greater protection for judicial review in military cases
than the principle of deference.
Recent legislation offers some female soldiers an opportunity to
serve in combat. The question of broadening their opportunities in
the future remains. If Congress believes that combat exclusion is
more an issue of national security rather than of equal opportunity,
chances for women to expand their role in combat decrease. Much
depends on President Clinton's reactions to the findings of the Pres-
idential Commission. Despite recent setbacks concerning the Presi-
dential Commission's findings, the legislation, nevertheless, reflects
a major change in congressional and public opinion regarding wo-
men in combat.
Pamela R. Jonest
403 See Mulhern, supra note 262, at 117-18 (terming the criticism as the "cataclysmic
consequences" argument).
404 See Redish, supra note 262, at 1051.
405 As Professor Mulhern aptly argues, "[i]n law, as in science, a phenomenon that
refuses to conf6rm with orthodox theory should inspire reexamination of the theory."
Mulhern, supra note 262, at 98 (citation omitted).
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